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January 22 , 1968

The product which brings us together for this meeting
is one which has performed an exceptional service in the United States
for many years.

The potato chip is nutritious and economical.

Quite

apart from its adult uses, therefore, it has long stood between filial
America and starvation and, concurrently, between parental America
and bankruptcy.
While this comestible seems to me to be as American
as apple pie, I understand that it has also gone international.
Only last week, the Moscow newspapers reported a novelty food product
in the stores of that city which is called,

11

Khrustyaschi Kartofel."

The words translate, more or less, as "crunchy potato."
I am glad to be with you, today, for many reasons, not
the least because you have chosen to conduct your proceedings in
Florida.

It is a benign setting for a meeting .

problem is likely to seem amenable torolution.

Here, any business
Here, the drums of
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tons of potatoes and cabbage
more than in the correspond·
in!!! period of 1966."
The passengers, I found,
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are such a part of Siberia.
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three years ago. The city
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across the rivl.'r a vast new
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The Trans-Sibl'rlan Rail·
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pie who tra\'el on it talk or
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train rolls on, and before Its
windows spreads one of the
last gn•at frontiers of the
world.
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war in Viet Nam are likely to sound distant and the same is true of
the rumblings of violence in many of the nation's cities.
Florida is something like the place of the Sirens in
the Odyssey.

It evokes a mood that is much easier to stay with than

to go from .

I regret, however, that I am cast in the role of Ulysses

for your proceedings.
matters.

I must draw your attention to less pleasant

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)

at the
POTATO CHIP INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL CO'·:-{FERENCE
THE AMERICANA, BAL HARBOUR, FLORIDA

Monday, January 22, 1968
12:00 noon

TWO FACES OF VIOLENCE

I ask you to examine with me, today, the two faces
of violence which confront the nation--the ugly business in Viet
Nam and the ugly business in the nation's urban centers.

These

issues are back-to-back on the coin of contemporary crisis.

No

matter what our personal pursuits, these issues involve us deeply.
It does not take a crystal ball to see that, as
we enter the new year, the outlook in either case is not very
reassuring.

The trends of the war in Viet Nam continue to push

us further into the bog of Southeast Asia.

By the same token, the

fever of social discontent and the terror of random and runaway
crime are unabated in many of the nation's cities.

As the chill
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of winter gives way to spring and summer, a recrudescence of the
violence which is inherent in this situation is to be expected.
There is the prospect of more mob action and rioting in the pattern of mid-1967.

If violence of that kind occurs

again, it will be suppressed again.

The protection of the right

of the citizen to be secure in his person is the first responsibility of government--federal, state, or local.

Let there be no

doubt, therefore, that the use of force will unleash the counterforce of constituted authority.
Let there be no doubt either, however, as to the
limitations of force in the kind of situation which plagued
many cities of the nation last summer.

The right of the citizen

to be secure has never been and can never be adequately protected
by police power alone.

Rather, it is a r i ght which is best

protected in and by a community which is right for all its
citizens.

- 3 The first responsibility of responsible government,
therefore, is not the last.

While it will be concerned with the

immediate protection of people and their property, a responsible
government will also be concerned with building the kind of communities in which all people can live in personal decency and
harmonious dignity.

It will be concerned with the adequacy and

equity of the educational opportunities which are available to all
young people .

It will be concerned with the well-being of the un-

employed, the poor and the helpless.

It will be concerned with

the protection of the health of the community, yes, including the
right of all children to be safe from rats.

It will be concerned

with playgrounds and parks and the wise guidance of young people
when guidance is not otherwise available to them.
The responsibility for meeting these and other
urgent needs of the cities obviously does not rest with the
federal government alone.

Every American, every private associa -

tion of Americans, every state and every municipal government,
shares the responsibility.

Indeed, I wish that rather than the

- 4 federal
,state and local governments,
;government, individuals/and other institutions of our society
would take the great preponderance of the burden.

Nevertheless,

the interests of the entire nation demand that the responsibility
be met somewhere.

To the extend that it is not adequately met

elsewhere, it is going to be met by the federal government.
The problem which confronts us in the nation's
cities is the safety of the streets and it is larger than the
safety of the streets.
than crime.

The problem is crime and it is larger

The problem is control of mobs and riots and it is

larger than mobs and riots.

In the last analysis, the problem is

nothing less than the transformation of those great centers of
population which have become places of increasing hostility to
decent human habitation if not to human survival itself.
The problem is vast and it is urgent.

It involves

directly Americans who are gathering in increasing numbers in and
around the urban centers of the nation.
cans are now domiciled.
their living.
so tomorrow.

That is where most Ameri·-

That is where most Americans now make

vlhat is already the case today will be even more

- 5 If the urban problem is complex in 1968, think of
what it will be like a few years hence.

The turn of the century

is less than 33 years away and by the year 2000, it is expected
that over 150 million persons will have been added to the nation's
present population of 200 million.

Where else but in and around

the cities will this great increase be lodged?

What does this

imminent growth in numbers mean in terms of urban transportation,
water supply, air supply, safe streets, public health, housing,
recreation or whatever?
It is readily apparent what it means .

It means that

there will be either a dynamic concentration of public leadership
and great human and material resources on the difficulties of the
urban areas or there will be national disaster.
I happen to come from a State with great open spaces
and a small population and, hence, few of the immediate ills which
plague the metropolitan centers .

Yet, it would be short-sighted in

the extreme to assume that any region in this country--urban, suburban or rural--is immune to the catastrophe which threatens in
metropolitan areas .

We are one nation .

We are all in it together .

- 6 In the endJ if the bell tolls, it will not toll for the cities
alone, or the suburbs alone, or for New YorkJ Chicago, Detroit or
San Francisco alone.

In the end, it will toll for all of us.

The pressing need is for a well-rounded national
program which, when coupled with the initiatives and efforts of the
cities and states and private associations, will be adequate to mee·
the explosive situation in the urban areas .

A beginning has been

made under the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations.

In the last two

Congresses a substantial legislative base has been laid.

Like all

beginnings, it has its flaws, inadequacies and excesses.

Neverthe-

less, the beginning is significant.
Speaking in all frankness for the Senate, I want to
say that Republicans as well as Democrats share in this achievement.
Under the leadership of Senator Everett Dirksen, Republican

Senator~

along with Democrats, have approached the problem with a minimum of
partisanship and a deep sense of national responsibility.

Not a

few of the measures which have passed owe their enactment to the
cooperative votes of Republican Senators.

- 7 I regret to say that, while we have made a beginning,
the problem of the follow--through has been difficult.

No matter how

much we have tried to avoid j_t, the Vietnamese conflict has brought
about a diversion of initiative, energy and public attention, not
to speak of funds, from the pressing problems of the cities .

The

President has tried to deal with the conflicting demands on the
nation's will and resources by practicing budgetary restraints and
economies in spending and by pinpointing those federal programs
which will have maximum impact on the urban problem at minimum cost.
He has centered attention, for example, on a Model Cities Program
which can improve the housing, jobs, education and health care of
millions of the poor, at a cost of approximately $100 per person
affected .

His Rent Supplement Program is designed to stin1ulate

private enterprise to construct and operate decent housing for low
income families.

It is estimated that every $600 of rent supple-

ments will allow private industry to construct and maintain housing worth twenty times that much .

- 8 The President ' s

11

Safe Streets and Crime Control 11

proposal gives emphasis to the needs of local law enforcement and
rehabilitation; its enactment will stimulate localities throughout
the nation to strengthen and to improve police departments and to
modernize their technologies .

May I say that, in my judgment, it

is high time that this effort is to be made.

All too often, the

police are inadequately equipped and supported by their communities
All too often, they are made the scapegoats for situations for
which they have no responsibility.

All too often, the stereotyped

cry of "police brutality" goes up as a cloak for irresponsible
hostility towards the police or simply because there is no one
else handy to blame .

All too often, the police must take great

personal risks and perform onerous tasks without adequate training
and under working conditions and at rates of pay which border on
the disgraceful.

A change in that state of affairs is an essential

part of a change for the better in the environment of the cities
and the President's proposal on safe streets and crime control is
designed to help bring about the change.

- 9 What needs to be done in the nation ' s cities will
not come cheap.
is costly.

The over- all program set forth by the President

So, too, however, is the cost of inertia, neglect,

and indifference.

What, for example, is the price of the burned-

out cities of the summer of 1967?

What is the monetary value of

the property which was damaged or destroyed?
many innocent, which were forfeit?

What of the lives,

And what of the residue of

racial suspicion, hostility,and hate which remains after the nightmares of Newark, Detroit, and a dozen other places?
Compare, too, the two or three billions especially
earmarked for the urgent needs of America's cities with the cost
of the war in Viet Nam which now claims more than $25 billion a
year out of the federal budget .

That brings me to the other face

of violence which confronts the nation--to Viet Nam.

I wish that

I could tell you that the problem of Viet Nam was on the way to
solution.

The fact is, however, that the trend of the war is still

upward, still expansive .

It is true that there has been a spate

of rumors in recent weeks on the possibility of peace talks .

It
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is to be hoped that they will lead to some tangible result.

I

know that the President wishes that they might lead to tangible
results.

I would be less than frank, however, if I did not say

that as yet, there are no clear indications of tangible results .
In the meantime, the conflict continues to edge
upward, in the pattern of recent years.

What was, less than three

years ago, a war among Vietnamese, has grown into what is basically
a war between the United States, in concert with allies, against
Vietnamese.
As late as May 1965, there were only 45,000 U. S.
troops in Viet Nam.
4oo,ooo.

By the end of 1966, the number had risen to

It is around 485,000 today and the total is scheduled to

go to 525,000 by mid- 1968.

These figures do not include the U. S.

military establishment of many thousands in Thailand.

Nor do they

include the vast naval and air-support forces for Viet Nam which
are posted in bases throughout the Pacific, from Honolulu westward .
As the depth of our involvement has grown, so, too
has the extent of our casualties.

In mid-1965, the South Vietnamere
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allies suffered eight combat deaths for every American killed in
action.

In 1966, the ratio had changed to two South Vietnamese

killed in action for each Americano

Last year, American combat

deaths were on a par with our South Vietnamese allies .
Over- all, the figure for U.
more than 16,000 and the total of all
wounded, is approaching 120,000.
comparable figure was 160,000.

u. s.

s.

dead now stands at

casualties, including

For all of the Korean War, the
That figure, moreover, was reached

only after the conflict had pitted our f orces not only against
the North Koreans but also against great numbers of Chinese in
Korea.

In Viet Nam, by contrast, not only have the Chinese not

been directly engaged, even the regular North Vietnamese armies
under General Giap have not been fUlly engaged against us in
South Viet Nam.
The cost of the war in dollars has come high.
Early in 1966, with 235,000 American troops stationed in Viet
Nam, the generally estimated annual expenditure for military
operations was $13 billion.

Towards the end of 1967 with

4oo,ooo

American troops present, however, the annual rate of expenditures
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was calculated at $21 billion.

Today, with 484,000 American

combat personnel engaged, the monthly rate of expenditure could
be about $2.5 billion.
The vast spending in Viet Nam has raised the budget
of the Defense

Departme~t

to over $70 billion, a figure which

represents more than 60 per cent of all federal expenditures .

The

spending for the war not only lies at the root of the federal
budgetary difficulties, it also has been a major inflationary force
in the nation's economy and has had a most adverse effect on the
nation's international financial position .

The President's

requ~~

for curbs on foreign travel and investment, for example, would
appear largely attributable to the war in Viet Nam.
For the present, nevertheless, there is no alternative to the continuance of vast expenditures for military operations in Viet Nam.

As long as the policies of this nation require

young Americans to risk their lives in that distant land, financial
considerations will remain secondary.

We can and we will do what

must be done to meet the costs of those policies.

- 13 I have pointed out that the solution of the problem
of American cities lies in a deepening public commitment.

The solu-

tion of the problem of Viet Nam may well involve, in my judgment,
the avoidance of a deepening of an already great commitment.

To

end the violence, actual and incipient, in our cities, we need to
mobilize our resolve and our resources--federal, state, local and
private--as one nation and one people.

By contrast, the first step

in ending the violence in Viet Nam may well be the exercise of
great restraint to keep from getting more deeply involved , not only
in Viet Nam but throughout Southeast Asia.
It is for that reason that I have joined Senator
Cooper of Kentucky in urging that the use of aerial bombardment
be pinpointed to the support of our forces in South Viet Nam and
to the entry points of the infiltration routes which lead from
North Viet Nam.

That is not the kind of aerial and naval bombard-

ment which heretofore has been carried on against North Viet Nam.
Heretofore the bombing has been extended throughout Viet Nam to
within five seconds of the Chinese borders and our planes have even
been brought down inside Chinese territory.

Nevertheless, the

- 14 -·
massive bombing campaign against North Viet Nam has not accomplished
either its military objective of stopping the infiltration or its
political objectives of bringing North Viet Nam to the conference
table.

It has been morally catastrophic and as it has spread and

intensified, it has generated the risk of additional U. S. involvement.
Because I believe that the interests of the United
States require that the war be restrained rather than enlarged,
I was delighted that Prince Nnrodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, one of
the ablest national leaders of Asia, invited President Johnson to
send an emissary to discuss the avoidance of a spill-over of the
conflict into Cambodia.

It would be my hope that the cordial

agreement which he reached with the President's Ambassador, Chester
Bowles, will have that effect and that the agreement's constructive
achievements will not be undone by gratuitous interpretation.
I am frank to say that I do not know how, when or in
what circumstance an honorable solution will be found to the conflict in Viet Nam.

I am persuaded, however, that it is not going

to be found in more aerial bombardment.

w~

have already dropped

- 15 more than 100 pounds of explosives for every inhabitant of Viet
Nam, north and south.

The total tonnage which has fallen to date

on that primitive land is greater than that used by the United
States in the European theater throughout all of World War II and
three times that in the entire Pacific theater.
If an answer to Viet Nam is not going to be found
in the bombing of the North, I am persuaded, too, that it will not
be found by extending the war even further afield, whether into
Cambodia, Laos or North Viet Nam, not to speak of China.

In short,

I do not believe that the restoration of a rational peace in this
tragic situation lies along the road of ever-widening war.
After a visit to Viet Nam in 1965, with several
Senate colleagues, we stated the view that the military problem
which confronted the nation was • not one of applying increased
U. S. pressure to a defined military situation, but rather of
pressing against a military situation which is, in effect, open
ended. 11

- 16 Two years later, that is still the problem.

The

logical consequence of greater American involvement is still
greater American involvement.

At some point in this process, if

it continues, the escalator may well go out of control .

The war

could then spread throughout the Asian mainland and push headlong
towards a catastrophic world conflict.
Neither our national interests nor the interests
of international peace and order are served by permitting ourselves
to be
Asia.

draw~

by the actions of others ever deeper into Southeast

It ought to be for us --not for others-- to decide how far

we will go and when we will stop going further .

In my judgment,

if there is a first step out of the dilemma of Viet Nam, it is to
blow the whistle now on further involvement.

We need to limit

our participation in this conflict to South Viet Nam.

We need to

restore the emphasis of the struggle to what it was in the first
place--a conflict of Vietnamese with Vietnamese, to be resolved
primarily by Vietnamese in accordance with the concepts of the
Geneva agreements.

- 17 That is why negotiations must be sought by this
nation.

They must be sought not in deference to those who are

hostile to us but, in all good sense, in our own national interestE
and in the interests of the Vietnamese people, north and south,
who have suffered, along with us, most cruelly.

Finally, we owe

a continuing effort for peace to the world because a conflict of
this kind is not circumscribed and contains the seeds of world
conflict.
It was for that reason, may I say, that I introduce<
a resolution in the Senate some months ago asking that a formal
initiative be undertaken by our government in the United Nations
Security Council in an effort to bring about negotiations either
in that forum or at a Geneva Conference, or in any other appropriate setting .

Eighty-two Senators voted for that resolution and

none opposed it.

I regret that circumstances have apparently not

permitted the taking of the initiative which was urged by that
resolution.

I regret that, for whatever the reasons, many weeks

- 18 have gone by and the

u.

N., in the sense of taking formal action

under the Charter, continues as it has since the outset, to remain
oblivious to the breakdown of peace in Viet Nam.
In my judgment, it is long past due for nations to
stand up and be counted on the question of peace in Viet Nam.

I

see no reason why a confrontation of the United States, North Viet
Nam, the Soviet Union, China, and all others directly or indirectly
involved in Viet Nam, which will make clear to the world who is
prepared to negotiate a solution to the Vietnamese problem and who
is not, cannot initially occur in the United Nations Security
Council.

There is precedent for inviting non-members of the U.N.

and even non-nations to meet for discussions before that body.
As it is, each day that goes bywill see a further
strain on the few restraints which remain in this barbarous war.
On the basis of past experience, each day that goes by without a
cease-fire is likely to see twenty Americans killed and one hundred
and twenty-five wounded, plus a like number of South Vietnamese

- 19 soldiers, not to speak of the enemy casualties and the countless
civilians caught in the cross-fires of war.
As at home in the crisis in our cities, we have
an obligation to ourselves and to our children to face up to the
situation .

We have an obligation to leave no stone unturned, no

avenue unexplored, no effor t unmade in seeking a negotiated end
to this long night of violence in which we find ourselves, ten
thousand miles from home.

J

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
at the

50TH ANNIVERSARY DINNER OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
THE MAYFLOvffiR HOTEL,

WASHINGTON,

C.

D~

Thursday, January 25, 1968

9:20 p. m.
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FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COMING CAMPAIGN

Foreign policy will be the predominant issue in
the coming election.

Its pre-eminence should be more complete

than during any election since the Korean conflict.

The campaign

could well develop into a probing discussion of many basic
national attitudes -- some which have gone unchallenged for years .
From the discussion, if it is responsibly pursued, may come
lasting benefits to the nation .
Each campaign issue, as it unfolds, will
inevitably arrive at the doorstep of foreign poli cy.

In the

light of the urban problem, for example, the diversion of the
public initiative which is imposed by our overseas commitments
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will make foreign policy an ingredient of any discussion of
this chief domestic issue.

Any consideration of economic issues

sooner or later must involve the state of our balance of payments.

That, in turn, will bring on a consideration of the

costs of our worldwide military and other commitments --not only
in Viet Nam but in Europe and elsewhere around the world.
If the level of discussion rises above personalities, I think this election year may be remembered for its
great contribution to changing attitudes on foreign policy.

At

the least, there should be a greater understanding both at home
and abroad of our nation's role in world politics.
In many ways, 1968 will be a watershed year for
American elections.

It is the first Presidential election in

which those who were babies at the end of World War II will be
eligible to vote.

The attitudes of these young adults may well

reflect a perspective of the contemporary world which is much
sharper than that of those of us who have borne witness to the

- 3 victories and defeats of the past and, in that sense, are its
sometime prisoner.
With a fresh generation of Presidential voters,
a questioning election is likely .

The questions asked will

strike at premises many of us have accepted and built upon for
years.

The new generation was born too late to be influenced

by post World War II furies, fixations, and fears.

Its members

frankly question policies which were designed two decades ago
for two decades ago and largely for jousting with what was then
assumed to be the indivisible monolith of Communism.

For this

new generation, the divergent experiences of Yugoslavia and
Albania, not to speak of China, are highly relevant challenges
to the basic assumption .

The new generation of voters may well

insist upon more than patent-medicine policies in response.
This generation may insist, too, that government's direct
responsibilities in the face of the unrest and rebelliousness
at home is at least as great as its indirect responsibilities

- 4 in dealing with violence elsewhere in the world and they will
not be put off by scornful references to isolationism--nee- or
any other kind.
The questions that this new generation of voters
asks may at times

be naive, but such a characteristic often

accompanies a fresh appraisal of basic concepts.

To them it

may appear incongruous that we find ourselves all too often
striving abroad against the tide of change and tugging on behalf
of the status guo.
The recent announcement of the United Kingdom
of the abandonment of long held overseas bases east of Suez
shall make this question very pertinent.

While an older genera-

tion might say, let's fill the "vacuum," left by the withdrawal
of the British, young Americ ans may see the departure as a
chance to test regional and international responsibility in
lieu of a 19th century unilateralism.
I think that voters of all ages may be interested
in listening to the questions of young people and that they will

- 5 insist upon thoughtful answers to the questions .
education may do us all some good.

Indeed, the

At the least, this new and

enlightened generation shall contribute greatly to the style of
the coming political campaign, not because it has become a
significant voting bloc, but because its clear eyes and clear
voice can do much to direct the ne..ture o.nd the depth of the
discussion .
Complementing this new focus is the influence
that television will have on the probing of fo.reign policy l>y
the younger voters in the coming campaign .

Television is

recognized to have contributed, perhaps decisively, to the
outcome of the tight 1960 Presidential election.

In a very

different way, it may play an equally significant role in 1968.
11ithout venturing into Mr. Harris' profession,
I suspect that a substar:tial portion of this cou!ltry now receives
much of its information on national and international affairs
primarily from television.

Americans who in the past would be

- 6 content to read no further than a headline and leave the conduct
of international affairs to Washington have gained from television a new interest and understanding of world happenings.
The growth of the middle class, as Mr. Harris has so ably documented, has changed the emphasis from the old economic issues
of the thirties.

Even as the deep interest of the electorate

in foreign relations will be manifest in the elections of 1968,
television will give to the issues which arise
issues of war) a new dimension.

(a!l~

notably the

Never before, for example,

have so many millions of Americans

bee~

exposed, day after day,

to a life and death struggle WC1.ged 10,000 miles away-- but
observed each evening at home in living color.

Never before

have American pare11ts borne witness to the battles in which
their own sons may be involved .
And as the nation's concern has

~Entered

ever

more deeply on Viet Nam, the issues of that struggle have
become more closely entwined with fundamental domestic issues .

- 7 Inextricably woven within the structure of the war, for example,
is the issue of what has been called the crisis in the cities-a problem as grave and complex as the war--and as costly, if
one were to put the full price tag on the disintegration of the
urban environment and what it may portend.

With only a fraction

of what it is costing to fight the war, much could be done to
alleviate inadequate housing, to improve health and welfare
programs, to provide better education and jobs--to reduce
poverty and discrimination and tensions.
The past seven years wi ll be recorded as years
of great domestic achievement for the people of America.

In

the fields of medical care, education, health, human rights,
housing and economic growth, the legislative base for improvementa has been strengthened more than in any comparable period
in our history.

But there is so much to do.

And the strain

of domestic needs versus overseas commitment shall reveal itself
in the form of a mare searching examination of any outworn or
dubious premises of foreign policy and their costs.

- 8 The dis cussions of foreign atfairs in the coming
election are to be welcomed .

They should strengthen greatly

the national awareness of the

significa~ce

of this dimension

of our national life and may well contribute to t.be development
of more adequate policie3 for this nation in world affairs .
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VIET NAM

My remarks, today, deal with Viet Nam .

Before

proceeding to them, however, I wish to refer to the USS Pueblo
incident.

When added to the Vietnamese conflict, it is illustra-

tive of the hydra-headed character of military involvement on
the mainland of Asia.

War spreads readily on that continent;

the difficulty lies in curbing it.

I would emphasize, therefore,

that while the urgency in Viet Nam is to bring one bloody conflict
to a close, the imperative in Korea is to prevent the opening
of another .
In the latter connection, it will help to bear in
mind the essentials of the Pueblo affair.

A U.

s.

vessel- - that

it was an electronic listener of some sort is not disputed--was

(
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in a posit Lon off t:1e North Korean coast.

What vi tal national

need prompted the dispatch of this particular mission or why the
vessel went undeffmded are not known.
A l~

reports available to me indicate that the

Pueblo was in i nternational waters at the time it was taken .
As of the morJf.mt, the Pueblo is now at anchor in Wonsan harbor
and the 82 S'trviving crewmen who were aboard--one other has
died--are interned in North Korea.

That ineluctable fact is

in no way altered by a sense of outrage or indignation.
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying out a
dangerous assignment .

The "why" and the "how" of the mission

are moot at thts point.
those men .

What matters now is the obligation to

In our reactions to the Pueblo affair, lives must

not become the pawns of either pride or petulance.

Every effort

to bring about their release must be made.
We will also do well to bear in mind that the one
war in which we are engaged on the Asian mainland has become a
source of immense grief.

Any move which leads into a second

-·
- 3 -

Vietnamese- type conflict in Korea will compound the grief but
hardly serve the interests of this nation .
In sum, what most matters at this point, it seems
to me, is:

(1)

return of the 80- odd American crewmen· alive--

I repeat , alive--and; (2) prevention of a second war in Kor ea
on the pattern of Viet Nam which could the more readily become
World War III.
The firm restraint which President Johnson has
exercised from the outset of the Pueblo affair has set a wise
course for this nation .

The question has been raised at the

United Nations Security Council by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg.
It has been pursued at the Panmunjom truce site in discussions
between our representatives and those of North Korea . ·· Other
channels are also being tapped which might lead to the release
of the crewmen.

In short, the President's policy at this time

is to seek a solution by diplomacy.

It is the course of prudence

and reason in what is , at best, a delicate and dangerous
tion .

It deserves ever y support of the nation .

sit~a -

- 4 There is no certainty that the present efforts
will bear fruit.
available .

Other possibilities, however, may also be

I would point out, for example, that, if necessary,

the matter should be pressed further at the United Nations which
has had a defi nite responsibility in Korea for almost two decades
If it comes to that, it may be feasible to seek impartial arbitration or mediation or a presentat ion o f the entire matter to
the World Court .

May I say that precedent f or the latter proce-

dure is to be found in a similar dispute two decades ago over
the loss of two Bri tish destroyers off the Albanian Coast.
Whatever the specific recourse, in my judgment,
the efforts to find a peaceful solution in the Pueblo affair
are attuned to this nation's i nterest.

What matters in my

judgment i s saving lives, not savi ng face.

What matters is

the substance not the shadow of this nat i on's i nterests .
That is true in Korea; and i t is no less true in
VietNam .

The nation's interests in Viet Nam, in my judgment,

lie in bringing the war to an honorable conclusion at the

- 5 earliest possible moment.

The pursuit of a negotiated solution

was right for this nation before the recent coordinated offensives in the South Vietnamese cities.

It is right today, while

that offensive continues in certain areas and when a second
offensive may be on the verge of opening, if not in Khe Sanh,
somewhere else in the remote highlands of central Viet Nam.
Insofar as I can see, negotiations are and have
always been the only rational alternative in this situation to
an indefinite U. S. involvement on the Southeast Asian ma:nland.
Two years ago I joined four Senate colleagues, including Senator
Muskie, in a report at the conclusion of a visit to Southeast
Asia .

Our principal observation, then, was that the American

position in Viet Nam had the character of ''pressing against a
military situation which is, in effect, open-ended."

We added

this comment:"How open is dependent on the extent to which North
Viet Nam and its supporters are willing and able to meet
increased force by increased force . 11

~ncreA~e

It is more apparent now

than it was at the time that the war is open-ended .

How open

- 6 may be uncertain--in my judgment it is still wide open--but in
any event, to date, the NLF and the North Vietnamese have been
both able and willing to meet increased force with increased
force.
At the beginning of 1966, the United States alreadJ
had 180,000 men in Viet Nam.

American forces directly involved

in the war have since tripled to something approaching 600,000-with over 500,000 on the ground in Viet Nam and the others serving the war from elsewhere in the region.
t i es have gone well past 100,000.
k i lled i n action showed a

Total American casual-

Last year's toll of those

~

i ncrease in two years, from

1,964 in 1965 to 9,353 in 1967.
This increase i n the American military effort has
been met by i ncreases i n the North Vietnamese-NLF effort; their
casualties, too, have increased greatly.

The war, in short,

has risen over the past three years to ever higher intensities
of destructiveness.

The bas i c juxtaposition in Viet Nam, however

- 7 -

has not been altered as anticipated .

In the spring of 1965, the

all- consuming objective of the American effort was to prevent
the collapse of a government with which we had allied ourselves .
Almost three years later, countless thousands of lives later ,
and tens of billions of dollar s later , that is still the
objective .
One can put whatever interpretation one chooses
on the recent events in Viet Nam .

To me , however, they suggest

that the survival of the Saigon political structure, in its
present form, may now be more uncertain.

The pacification

program appears to have gone the route of at least a dozen prior
schemes for ''winning the people" by providing them with security
and a stake in the structure .

The cities of South Viet Nam

which have heretofore been spared most of the ravages of the war,
almost by tacit understanding, have now been drawn into the
vortex of its terrible devastation .

If there is an alternative

to chaos in what has he r etofor e been the core of the government's

- 8 strength, it will lie in yet another costly task of reconstruction and rehabilitation

wh~ch

can hardly be borne by the South

Vietnamese government .
What is now clear is that no part of South Viet
Nam is secure for anyone .

The hamlets , villages , and the cities

of Viet Nam are seen to be honeycombed with a NLF infrastructure
which has undoubtedly existed for many years, which is still
intact and which may well be

str~nger

than ever .

It is possible to point to one-sided casualty
figures and to echo one - sided words of reassurance.

If we are

interested in saving lives rather than saving face, however, I
think we will find the reallsm to confront the implications of
the present situation .

The Saigon political structure is no

stronger today than it was three years ago in the sense of being
able on its own to govern, to defend or to rally the people of
South Viet Nam .

Indeed, its very survival now appears more

dependent upon American military power than at any time in the

- 9 -

past.

In short, once again there is not the beginnings of a

beginning of a stable political situation in South Viet Nam .
That such is the case , in no way reflects on the
courage or the competence of the military forces which have
carried the burden of combat in Viet Nam for many months.

In

statistical terms, these fo r ces have been immensely effective .
They have won major engagement after engagement .

The figures

say that over 87,000 enemy troops were killed last year, that
another 27,000 have crossed over to the government side and that
countless thousands were captured or were otherwise put out of
action .

Naval and air power have pounded so much of North Viet

Nam into rubble that ther e are left unscathed scarcely any
military or industrial targets .
Nevertheless , for the kind of war which is being
fought in South Viet Nam, the forces in opposition continue to
obtain adequate and, apparently, ever more sophisticated military supplies over the infiltration routes from the North.

The
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NLF remains omnipresent, from the demilitarized zone at the
17th parallel to the Mekong Delta and i ts regular forces and
guerillas are steeled to accept great privation and to make
enormous sacrifices .

The Vi et Cong remain entrenched and vir-

tually untouched in their traditional strongholds -- the swamps,
paddy- fields and hamlets of the Mekong Delta-- from whence they
are now seen to be able to dispatch forces to Saigon and other
citi es.

North Viet Nam has commi tted to the war in the South

considerably less than a quarter of the well- trained forces of
General Giap .

And beyond North Viet Nam lies the untapped

manpower of China and the supply sources of both China and the
Soviet Union.
These are some of the real:! ties wh t ch the computers of "progress" in this war do not measure .

These are

some of the real i ties whi ch urge us to recall the original
purposes for whi ch the nation was commi tted to South Viet Nam.
They were, above all> limited purposes.

We went into Viet Nam

not to take over a war but on the assumption that we were
summoned to aid the people of South Viet Nam.

- 11 -

From the outset, it was not an American responsi bility and it is not now an Ame r ican responsibility to win a
victory for any particular Vietnamese group, or to defeat any
particular Vietnamese group.

It was not then and it is not now

an American function to insure that any political structur e
shall be enshrined over the smolder i ng ruins of a devastated
Viet Nam.

Even if we could, we should not seek to synthesize

a government or system for South Viet Nam .

That is not the

responsj_bility of the American mi litary command, the American
economists and the American poli tical scientists who are
gathered in Saigon.

That is a responsibility which can only

be exercised by the Vietnamese people themselves .

The sooner

that the limits of our commitment are recognized by all
di rectly concerned, therefore, the better for all concerned .
We need to face the probability, bluntly, that
the build-up of the Ame r ican involvement, in its very
immensity, may well have already extended the role of this
nation beyond those limits.

In so doing , it may not be aiding- -

- 12 -

as it was intended- - to resolve the situation in accord with the
wishes of the people of South Viet Nam .

It is apparent, for

example, that the more that U. S. forces have taken the major
combat role, the slacker have been the efforts of the allied
indigenous forces.

It is apparent, too, that a massive U. S.

technological presence in South Viet Nam has exerted a revolutionary impact on the whole of the fabric of traditional
Vietnamese society.
In a physical sense, the crushing weight of
modern warfare has fallen not only on the Viet Cong- - the NLF-and the North Vietnamese but on all Vietnamese.

The terrible

cost in lives and property throughout Viet Nam is borne by
Vietnamese of all pol1tical colors .
Our immense effort, in short, has gone a long way
in altering the character of what was once an inner struggle
among Vietnamese.

In the end, however, the future of Viet Nam

must depend on the Vietnamese themselves .

It is their country;

- 13 they live i n it.

They will be living in it long after we are

gone from it .
Our commitment is to support, not to submerge .
To strip the Vietnamese struggle of its Vietnamese character,
to convert it into a war to be won or lost by this nation,
detracts from its relevance both to the people of Viet Nam and
to the people of the United States.

To do so is to consolidate

an American involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland of indefinite duration and obscure purpose whose terminus is not
visible--not in Viet Nam, not in Laos, or in Cambodia.

Indeed,

it may well be an involvement which is without exit except in
World War III.
This nation is deeply committed in South Viet Nam
but let us not make the mistake of interpreting that commitment
as compelling us--in the name of victory or whatever-- to see to
it that every last member of the NLF is either dulled, dead, or
fleeing to the North, and that North Viet Nam has been bombed
back into the Stone Age.

That course leads not to an ending but

- 14 to an endless succession of vjol ent beginnings.

An interminable

involvement of American forces may meet the desires of some in
Viet Nam or of some other nation, but that course does not
accord with the substance of the interests of the United States.
President Johnson has repeatedly stated that this
nation's objective is n ... only that the people of South VietNam
be allowed to guide their own country i n their own way.n

He

has stated that he is w5lli ng to move at any time in negotiations
which might bring about that result.
It should be made clear to all concerned--Americans and Vietnamese- - that that is the extent of this nation's
commitment.
Viet Nam.

The commitment is to all of the people of South
We have no obligati on to continue to pour out the

blood and resources of this nation until South Viet Nam is
made safe f or one faction or another.
Indeed, in my judgment, there is little prospect
of meeting our actual commitment to the people of Viet Nam in
the visible future unless there is a prompt restoration of

- 15 peace.

On that basis, every avenue--in the United Nations or

elsewhere- - should continue to be explored in an effort to reach
an honorable conclusion .

In so doing, this nation needs no

sanction or approval from any group, leader, or whomever in
Viet Nam or anywhere else.
In the hope of bringing about a peaceful settlement without adding to the burdens of the American forces in
the south, I have joined Senator Cooper and others in urging
that the bombing of North Viet Nam be restricted to the infiltration routes at the 17th parallel.

I am frank to say, however

that while it may well result in negotiations, I am not at all
sure that a cessation of the bombing is the critical factor in
bringing this war to an honorable conclusion.

More important,

in my judgment, ts the framework in which the war in Viet Nam
is seen and within which its conclusion is negotiated.

It is

doubtful that there is a basis for fruitful negotiations if
the conflict is defined as a simple case of aggression on the
part of the North against the South .

The reality is far more

- 16 complex, far more subtle.

That is true insofar as the relation-

ship between North and South Viet Nam is concerned.

It is true

insofar as the relationship of the various groups and elements
within SouthViet Nam is concerned.

The government in Saigon,

as it is presently constituted continues to be run by a faction
of military officers--indeed, most of whom are northerners-and they are by no means the whole political coin .

There are

other grJups of southern Vietnamese who must be taken more into
consideration i f there is to be an end to the bloodshed in the
foreseeable future.
the

Nat ~ onal

These groups include not only those within

Liberation Front but elements wh · ch are now without

significant voice in either camp.
A negotiated solution, if there is to be one, may
well involve preliminary discussions among the political, religous, and sectarian groups, as well as the ruling military group,
which are to be found under the Saigon structure.

If there can

be some common agreement among them to seek a settlement of the
war, it is at least conceivable that there could then be

- 17 discussions with the National Liberation Front.

Needless to

say, such discussions can hardly take place if the Saigon government regards even words of compromise as treasonable.
If the door could be opened to peace-talks among
the South Vietnamese themselves, one would hope that it would
make easier the opening of doors to negotiat i ons between this
nation and North Viet Nam and among all the nations directly or
indirectly concerned in the conflict.

A basis might then be

laid for applying the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 in determining the future relationship of the two parts of Viet Nam and
for guaranteeing the neutralization of Viet Nam and all of IndoChina.

May I add it does not much matter whether such discus-

sions are held under United Nations auspices or j_n Geneva, or
in some other appropriate forum.

What is necessary is that

they encompass all who are closely involved, including China,
if there is to be a durable peace in

V~

Nam and Indo-China.

- 18 I do not know whether there are any greater
prospects for progress towards peace in this approach than
in the countless others wh i ch have been suggested.

I believe,

however, that unless there is the beginning of a negotiated
peace, the fires of war in Viet Nam will blaze ever more
fiercely.

They will spread further and further, leaving

ever wider arcs of a piteous wreckage.

And if the fires

burn out of control to World War III, what nation will
claim the victory?
claim it?

Indeed, what nation will be left to

....
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ASSESSMENT IN VIET NAM

The struggle in Viet Nam has turned grim, pitiless,
and devastating.

The casualty figures are staggering.

cal damage is enormous.

The physi -

Men, women, children, soldiers, guerillas,

weapons, machines, cities, towns, and villages--all are thrown
together in an inferno of destruction.
It is not surprising that the situation has been
interpreted in some quarters as approaching some sort of climax .
It may well be, as has been suggested, the beginning of the end.
The question is what beginning and what end?

Peace by military

victory?

For what?

no

Peace by negotiations?

With whom?

There is

certainty at this point as to what will emerge in Viet Nam,

or for that matter, whether the end of this war is to be found
in Viet Nam .

- 2 -

I have no desire, therefore, to indulge, today, in
what has become a kind of parlor game called
Viet Nam? 11

11

Whol-s winning in

It is offensive to me, as I know it must be to you,

to hear this deadly conflict treated as some sort of athletic
contest .

The lives of too many young Americans are on the line

in Viet Nam .

Too many bewildered men and women and children are

being burnt, bloodied and broken by this \'Jar.
ruins.

Too many lie dead.

Too much is in

Viet Nam is not a game.

There can

be no winners; there are only losers and the longer the war persists the greater are the losses for all concerned.
The tragedy of Viet Nam constrains us all to great
sobriety in discussion.

There is little point in speculating on

the current clashes- - who is winning and who is not or what is being
won and what is not.

The need is to try to define accurately the

character of the present tragedy and, in that way, hopefully, to
see more clearly what the interests of this nation will require
in the days ahead.

3 In this respect, seldom has a pr oblem presented
greater difficulties than Viet Nam and seldom has the need for
a solution been greater .

A restoration of peace is imperative for

the welfare of the people of Viet Nam; they have been fought over
for so long that,in the millions, they are torn from their
ancestral places seeking refuge where there is no refuge .
us, too, an honorable solution is of the utmost urgency .

For
The war

in Viet Nam has been deeply divisive in its effects on this nation .
It has diverted energy and resources from the great needs of our
own society.

The vast difficulties of the urban areas, for

example, cry out for attention, but the cry is barely heard above
the din of the distant conflict.
The nation's economic equalibrium is in danger of
being thrown out of kilter by the immense demands of the war.

In

this connection, we have already suffered a significant degree of
inflation .

Furthermore, we are confronted with what can only be

called the embarrassment of having to discourage the travel of

.,.
- 4 Americans abroad, because of difficulties which the war and other
foreign commitments have introduced into the nation's balance of
payments .
In our relations with the rest of the world, the
war in Viet Nam has placed formidable blocks in the way of further
progress in international cooperation.

It has brought in its

wake new threats to the stability of peace, as in the case of the
USS Pueblo incident which may be but the precursor of others.

In

these pinpoints of instability, moreover, there are ever-present
threats to the frail defenses of the world against nuclear
catastrophe.
We did not arrive at this situation overnight.
involvement in Viet Nam is not new born.

Our

If we are at a cross-

roads, today, it is but one in a chain of crossroads which extends
backwards for many years.

There comes to mind, for example, the

moment of the French collapse and the Geneva Conferences of 1954:
the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and the
replacement of civilian government in Saigon by a series of

- 5 -

unstable regimes, drawn ever more steadily from military sources,
ever more dependent on the United States .

Finally, there comes

to mind the Tonkin Bay incident and the large- scale direct military engagement of the United States thereafter in the war in
Viet Nam .
In retrospect it is apparent that at each of these
crossroads the American military involvement has deepened .

It

is also apparent that the successive increases in military
commitment have led, so far, not to peace, but rather to an
increase in counter military commitment.

At the end of 1965,

five Senators including myself visited Viet Nam .

In a report

made public at the conclusion of our study, we stated that we had
found that this nation's military effort was

11

• • •

pressing against

a military situation which is, in effect, open ended.

How open

is dependent on the extent to which North Viet Nam and i·cs
supporters are willing and able to meet increased force by
increased force."

- 6 How open the war?

How able and willing the oppos-

ing forces to meet increased force by increased force?
Our armed forces in Viet Nam have increased from
23,000 at the beginning of 1965 to more than half a million today.
The bombing of North Viet Nam by air and sea has grown from
specific retaliation

f~

specific Viet Cong acts of offense

against our forces into the most systematic air and naval bombardment since World War II.

The tonnage of explosives which has

fallen upon Viet Nam is already higher than in Korea, or, for
that matter, in the entire Pacific Theatre during World Wa r II
and probably close to that unloosed in Europe.

Moreover, one by

one, the limitations on bombing-targets in North Viet Nam have
been removed until a mere handful is all that now stands against
indiscriminate destruction oflife and property.
search for an elusive

~ictory

Indeed, the

has led some to clamor for that

indiscriminate destruction, even to the point of returning Viet
Nam to the Stone Age.

-.

- 7 With escalation has come mounting losses of life on
all sides .

U.

s.

casualty lists are already longer in the first

five or six weeks of 1968 than they were during the entire year
of 1965.

In all of 1965, 1,369 Americans were killed .

By Febru-

ary 10, this year, 1,674 Americans had already been killed.
According to reports issued in Saigon on yesterday, 543 additional
Americans were killed in the last seven days, the highest weekly
total of the war.

The over-all f i gures now stand at 18,239 deaths

and the wounded total 112,469.

Among the opposing forces, of

course, there are reports of astronomical increases in men killed,
taken prisoner, or deserting .
I cite these gruesome figures to indicate the immense
growth in the scope of the conflict, particularly as it has
involved the United States.

I find it most inappropriate that

this effort and these great sacrifices are, in effect, called
i nadequate in some quarters .

The fact is that, short of what

Prime l<iinister Wilson has called the "lunacy" of nuclear war,
this nation has made a massive military effort in Viet Nam .

The
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effort has been made by dedicated Americans, ably led, who have
carried out their orders with courage and skill.
date, it ought at least to be

clea~

At this late

that if the situation in Viet

Nam has not changed as anticipated, it has not been for want of
an extraordinary military effort by the United States.

American

forces may well have done too much but by no stretch of the
i magination can it be said that they have done too little .
Nevertheless, the reality is that the situation has
not changed as anticipated.
Nam in

At the time of my last visit to Viet

1965, available estimates indi cated that 22 percent of the

population of South Viet Nam has under control of the National
Liberation Front, 60 percent under government control, and 18
percent contested.

At the end of last year, the

S ~ igon

govern-

ment was reported as controll i ng 67 percent of the population,
presumably a gain of 7 percent.

Substantial progress was also

reported in the so-called oac i fication program which had · · :. ·
been designed to strengthen and expand Saigon's control over
the rural areas.

- 9 Then came the wave of attacks against the cities
of South Viet Nam .

One can put whatever interpretation one

chooses on these recent clashes.

Whatever else they may mean,

they bring into question the validity of the measures of military
progress whi ch have been used in Saigon .

They bring into question

the effectiveness of the Saigon political structure, in its
present form.

They bring into question the pacification program

which appears to have gone the route of at least a dozen prior
contri ved techniques for "winni ng the people" of Viet Nam.

They

make clear, finally, that the cities of South Viet Nam which have
heretofore been spared, almost by tacit agreement, have now been
drawn fully into the vortex of the war's terrible devastation.
Whatever the outcome of the present battles, the
basic military problem is as i t has been from the outset .

The

war remains open- ended and escalation continues to rise with
escalation .

The National Liberation Front remains omnipresent,

from the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel to the southern
tip of the peninsula .

Its regular forces and guerillas a re
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obviously steeled to accept great privation and to make enormous
sacrifices .

The Viet Cong remain entrenched and virtually

untouched in their traditional strongholds--the swamps, paddyfields and hamlets of the Mekong Delta- -from whence they are able
to dispatch forces to reinforce units whi ch, as is now apparent,
honeycomb Saigon and other cities.
It is dangerous to presume that either the forces
of the National Liberation Front or North Viet Nam are nearing
the end of the r ope .

Actually, Hanoi has committed to the war

the
in/South considerably less than a quarter of the forces of
General Vo Nguyen Giap, who is generally credited with masterminding the current military strategy i n the South .

And beyond

North Viet Nam lies the untapped manpower of China and the supply
sources of both China and the Soviet Union.
These are some of the realities which are not
measured by the computers of "progress" in Saigon.

These are

some of the real i ties which seem to me to make it imperative to
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recall the original purposes of the American commitment to South
Viet Nam .

They were, above all else, limited purposes.

There

is not now and there has never been a mandate to take over a war .
The commitment is to support not to supplant.
At the outset, it was not an American responsibility
and it is not now an American responsibility to wtn a victory for
any part i cular group of Vietnamese or to defeat any particular
group of Vietnamese.

Even if we could, 1t is not in the interests

of this nation to synthesize a political structure for South Viet
Nam. That is not and ought not ever to become the function of
the American military command, the American economists, administrators, diplomats, political scientists, aid- officials, and
others who are gathered in Viet Nam .

The sooner that the limits

of our commitment are understood by all directly concerned the
better for all concerned.
It is time to recognize that our immense effort
has already gone a long way to alter the character of what was
once an inner struggle among Vietnamese .

It is also time to
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recognize that whatever we may do , the future of Viet Nam depends
not on us but on the Vietnamese themselves.
they live in it.

It is their country;

They will be living in it long after we are

gone from it .
Our responsibility is to sustain, not to submer ge.
To strip the Vietnamese struggle of its Vietnamese character, to
convert it into a war to be won or lost by this nation, is to
detract from its relevance both to the people of Viet Nam and to
the people of the United States.

To do so is to CJnsolidate an

American involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland of indefinite
duration and obscure purposes whose terminus is not visible--not
in Viet Nam, not in Laos, or in Cambodia .

Indeed, it may well

be an involvement wh l ch is without exit except in World War III .
This nation is deeply committed in South Viet Nam
but let us not make the mistake of interpreting that commitment
as compelling us--in the name of victory or Whatever- - to see to
it that every last member of the NLF is either dulled, dead,
captive, or in flight .

That course leads not to an ending but to

an endless succession of violent beginnings.

- 13 An inextricable involvement of American forces in
Viet Nam may meet the needs of some but it accords netther with
the interests of the United States or the people of Viet Nam .
this connection,

Pres~dent

In

Johnson has repeatedly stated that

this nation's objective is " ... only that the people of South Viet
Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way . "

He

has stated that he js willing to move at any time in negotiations
which might bring about that result.

He has stated that we are

prepared to move out lock, stock, and barrel in a matter of months
after a satisfactory settlement is ach7eved.
It should be clear, therefore, to all concerned- Americans and Vietnamese in \-Jashington , in sa· gon, and in Hanoi
and to whomever, wherever -- that that is the accurate measure of
this nation ' s commitment.

There is no obligation to continue to

pour out the blood and resources of this nat)on until South Viet
Nam is made safe for one Vietnamese faction or another.

On the

contrary, there is an obligation to the people of the United
States to conserve that blood and those resources and, to the

- 14 people of Viet Nam, there is an obligation to avoid the destruction of thei.r land and society even in the name of saving them.
Indeed, j_n my judgment, there is now little prospect
of meeting these deep obligations to the people of this nation
and to the people of

V~

Nam unless there is a prompt cessation

of the bloodl etting and the negotiation of an honorable settlement
For that reason, every possibility of peace must continue to be
explored fully and with the utmost urgency.
The North Vietnamese have stated that they will
open negotiations if the bombing of the North is discontinued.
In that connection, it should be noted, first, that the bombing
has not achieved the purposes for whi ch i t was sanctioned.

The

bombing has not stopped the movement of men and suppl i es into the
South ; on the contrary, the routes of infiltration carry a heavier
traffic than ever before and the traffic includes ever more
sophisticated weapons.

The bombing has done little, if anything,

for the morale of the people of South Viet Nam and such indications as there are, suggest that it has done a great deal to

- 15 strengthen the determj_nation of the people of N< rth Viet Nam .
Finally, the bombing has not yet brought Hanoi to the conference
table, as a suspension, now, pr obably will .

In short, the bomb-

ing of the North has added a vast dimension to the war .

It has

raised the cost of the war in lives and resources- - American and
other- - but it has not brought closer-- so far as can be seen-- an
honorable end to the conflict .
It is in this context that I have endorsed a proposal to confine the bombing to the infiltration routes at the
17th parallel.

It may be that in this proposal,whjch was advanced

initially by Senator Cooper of
India- -may be found

Kentuc~y - -a

former Ambassador to

a first step to peace .

I am frank to

state, however, that wh'le there is reason to expect an opening
of negotiat i ons if the bombing of the North is curbed, it is not
at all certain that negotiations, in turn, will bring the
conflict to an honorable conclusion.
they may fa i l.

Negotiations may be futile;

In the end, they may prove no more effective,than

military escalation has proved to be, in bringing this war to an
acceptable end .

- 16 Indeed, it is not likely that negotiations will be
fruitful at this time if the conflict i.s defined as a simple,
clear- cut case of aggression on the part of the North against the
South or as some sort of final test which has pitted the forces
of freedom in Viet Nam in a showdown against Communism .

The

reality in Viet Nam is far more complex, both in the relationships
which exist between North and South Viet Nam and among the various
groups and elements within South Viet Nam .

How complex, for

example, is indlcated by the composition of the present government
in Saigon .

It is based almost entirely upon a military faction

and most of its principals are not Southern Vietnamese but
Northern Vietnamese .

They are clearly not the whole coin of

pol tical leadership in South Viet Nam.

There are other sources

of indigenous leadership, other groups whi ch are without significant voice in the present Southern political structure .
It would be an advance towards peace, in my jucgment,
if the door to reconciliation could be opened among South Vietname ~ e

of all political inclinations .

If that is not to be,

- 17 however, I cannot see that the d i plomacy of this natj_on must
remain hog-tied by the inflex:i bility of others .

The responsi-

bilities which are owed to the people of this nation and Viet Nam
urge the seeking of an honorable peace , wherever and however it
may be found and regardless of who may be willing to join in the
search.
It is possible that the divergent fears and interests
which are involved--directly and indirectly-- i n the Vietnamese
conflict may still be reconcilable on the bas is of the Geneva
Accords of 1954 and 1962 .

ThEe agreements might still provide a

framework for determining, in peace, the future relationship of
the two parts of

Vj~

Nam and for guaranteeing the neutral ization

of Viet Nam and of Indochina .

A reactivation of the Geneva Con-

ference, therefore, by the co-cha;rmen-- the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union-- is clearly desirable .

Geneva, however, is not

necessarily the only beacon of peace and, in any event, it has yet
to be lit.

If the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a

group of Asian nations, European nations, African nations ,

- 18 Communist nations or any combination thereof were prepared and
able to convene a peace conference, those approaches, too, are
obviously worthy of every considerat ion .
The Senate voted a resolution on November 30th
last, urging that Viet Nam be brought actively before the
Security Council of the Unj.ted Nations .

The proposal was for a

direct approach to the problem by means of the open processes of
the U. N. Charter .
At the very least, an initjative in the U. N.
Security Council would help to clarify the significance of the
words of peace wh5ch are raised on all sides.

At the very least,

it could help to emphasize this nation's readiness to take its
chances on a peaceful settlement of the confl i ct in accord with
the world-sanctioned pr emises of the Charter .
In my judgment, we should and can make clear, by
procedural vote, that we are willing to submit this question of
Viet Nam to the Security Council .

1<Te should and can make clear,

- 19 by procedural vote, that we are pr epared to invite any nation or
group which is of relevance to a settlement, including Hanoi and
the NLF and China, to participate in a face - to-face discussion of
the war .

We should and can make clear, by procedural vote, that

if the emotions kindled by the conflict render undesirable a
meeting of the Security Council in New York, we are prepared to
see the Council meet in Geneva or
by the Charter .

anywhe~e

else, as provided for

In short, we should and can make clear, by votes,

that we are willing to follow the U. N. path to peace .
It would seem that among the 15 member nations of
the Security Council, there ought to be found at least the
required nj_ne votes to respond to an initiative of the United
States, calling for a U. N. effort to open the door to a settlement in Viet Nam.
Nevertheless, if such is not the case, jt seems
desirable to know now, by formal and open test, win or lose, who
is willing and who is unwilling to confront the issue of peace
in Viet Nam before the bar of the world.

May I say that it does
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no servjce to the United Nations to shrink from bringing before
it a situation which involves its fundamental reason for being.
On this point, I would note, too, that the members
of the U. N. ought not to overlook the obligations of the organization in connection with the rising tensions in Korea .

The

U. N. has been involved- - deeply involved- -for two decades in
Korea.

It was with the sanction of the U. N. that this nation

carried the main burden of the war which was fought in Korea.
It was with U. N. guidance that the truce in Korea was achieved.
It is still within the competence of the U. N. to deal with the
unresolved questions of Korea and, in particular, when they pose
threats of renewed war .
Insofar as

th~s

nation's unilateral responsibilities

respecting Korea are concerned, the firm restraint which President
Johnson has exercised from the outset in the Pueblo affair, in my
judgment, has set a wise course.

The question is being pursued

quietly at the Panmunjom truce site in discussions between our
representatives and those of North Korea .

Thl.rd-party channels

.,
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are also being explored .

In short, the effort at this time is

to seek by diplomacy the release of the crewmen alive-- I repeat,
alive .

It is a prudent course in what is, at best, a delicate

and dangerous situation and it deserves every support .
Talks at Panmunjom and the search for third party
intercession, however, do not begin to exhaust the possibilities
of solution .

If these efforts do not bear fruit, other options

may also be available.

The President has already had the matter

raised at the U. N. Security Council by Ambassador Goldberg .
necessary, it can and should be pressed anew in that forQm.

If
It

may be feasible, thereby, to seek an impartial investigation,
arbitration or mediation of the dispute or a presentation of the
entire matter to the World Court .
vfuatever the specific recourse, in my judgment, the
efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the Pueblo affair are
attuned to this nation's interest.
safe release of the crewmen.

What matters, first, is the

What matters most is the

not the shadow of thjs nation ' s interests .

subs~ance
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The flare-up in Korea, comi ng on top of Viet Nam,
indicates the hydra-headed potential of war on the Asian continent.

The new and dangerous confrontatj.on in the former suggests

the urgency of ending the conflict on an honorable basis in the
latter.

I do not know what the prospect for peace may be by way

of the U. N. approach whtch has been suggested.

Obviously, a

U. N. approach cannot be any less effective than the countless
other approaches which have already been attempted without succesc
On the other hand, it may not be any more effective.
In any event, somewhere, somehow, there must be the

beginnings of a negotiated settlement.

Until it is found, the

fires of conflict will blaze ever more fiercely J.n Viet Nam; the
arc of war's wreckage will continue to open on the continent of
Asia.

And if the fires burn out of control to Wor ld War III,

what nation will then claim the victory?
will be left to claim

it ~

Indeed, what nation
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It has been said with considerable validity that
a statesman is a dead politician.

I should like to note at the

outset, therefore, that it is my preference to remain for as long
as possible in the status of politician.

It is not that I am

unmindful of Senator Watkin's efforts to lift me by his words,
so to speak, to a higher plane.

I appreciate them more than I

can say.
I can lay claim, however, neither to the wisdom
nor the irreProachability which is usually associated with
statesmen .

On

the contrary, I acknowledge my full complement

of shortcomings and more than enough mistakes in a quarter of a

century of public life.

To the extent that I have not reproached

myself for them, there have been political opponents enough over
the years who have been ever-ready to call them to my attention.
The pot nt

that I am trying to make is that the

path of political virtue is neither one-track, clearly delineated,
nor brightly lit .

On the contrary, in a nation and time of

sharply conflicting interests, a public official has no choice
but to grope in a forest of many pressures in the search for
the course of responsibility.
I speak of this problem as a Member of Congress,
as a Senator.
line.

The integrity of every Senator is always on the

He learns to live with the constant stress of conflict-

ing interests or, soon enough, he dies from it.
This stress is greater, today, than at any time
in my experience in public life .

At home, our institutions are

seriously tested by a range of discontents and anxieties which

find a most disturbing expression in the great metropolitan
areas of the nation.

'

In these enclaves of poverty and deprtva-

tion a rage of despair, alienation, and bitterness tears at a
great segment of the nation's people.

There are, indeed, just

causes for discontent in these cores of concentrated human
inequity and social

i l~~

On

the other hand, we are distracted

from deali ng with these causes by the violence and rioting which
has occurred in many of the nation's cities in recent years and
whtch seems once again to be rising to a new summer of simmering
discontent.
Abroad, our institutions are tested, too, by the
inadequately understood commitments which have been assumed,
notably in Viet Nam.

We are in a war--deeply in a war--which

seems without end or exit.

Its persistence generates a grave

sense of national frustration and leads to a polarization of
positions in whi ch the alternatives which are advocated seem

to call for the total destruction of Vietnamese society in the
name of saving it or, virtually, the overnight withdrawal of
American forces from the conflict.
A Senator of the United States must try to come
to grips with the many specific questions which arise out of
these great issues and, of course, the many lesser problems of
government.

How, together with other elected officials, he

forms h1.s answers to these questions are the stuff of public
policy.

In the aggregate, his answers

contribu~significantly

to the determination of the direction and quality of our
national life.
A Senator does not respond to issues in a vacuum.
Rather he functions under the constant pressure of conflicting
interests .

There is , for example, the fundamental conflict of

personal affairs and public respons ibility.

It is not easy to

draw a fine line between the right of all Americans, including
Senators and other public officials, to the privacy of their

personal concerns and the right of the people to have the
nation's business conducted with full consideration of their
interests.

In a free society, personal affairs are thought to

be just that:

personal .

Even income tax returns are filed in

strictest confidence, with their improper disclosures made a
criminal offense .

Holding one's self open to public scrutiny

is not a practice which is appr eciated by Americans.
Nor do groups of Americans relish the necessity
of being singled out to submit to special codes of conduct .
Nevertheless, there are special codes for special situations
and, however reluctantly, groups of Americans do submit to
them .

Lawyers, for example, recognized long ago that the

special trust granted them required special canons to guide
their behavior in dealings with clients .
contact between doctor and patient .

So it is in the

I n a similar vein, the

Senate is now trying to come to grips with this problem as it

involves the special relationship of Senator to public.

What

is being sought are ethical standards which would make precise
the distinction between public interest and private financial
concerns.
A Special Committee of Senators has done extensive work on this question.

On that basis, I am hopeful that

the Senate will soon be able to act to adopt an adequate measure.
An effective code of financial ethics to guide Senators and
staffs should be helpful not only to the Senate but may also
point the way to the establishment of uniform public standards
for all federal officials--elected and appointed--in all branches.
The problem of possible conflicts in financial interests, after
all, can present itself not only in the Senate, but also in the
other branches of the government.
In my judgment, the achievement of a uniform
standard of ethics in this connection would serve to strengthen
the i nstitutions of government and public confidence in them.

It would provide a yardstick for helpi ng to assure that in a
r

free society, publ i c office remains a publi c trust, to be met
by a special commitment of all incumbents to the public interest.
The establishment of a uniform standard should
also help to curb public cyni cism r especting government which
is all too prevalent, especially among the young people of the
nation .

May I say that that is not a new state of affai rs .

Throughout the history of the nation, a publi c notion has
persisted--on occasion, not without cause--that the policies
and actions of the government, in one or more of its branches,
are not always formed on meri t, within a framework of the overall national i nterest .

There has been suspi cion that public

dec i sions are sometimes produced by private pressures, particularly by pressures which may be generated by substantial contributors to pol · tical campaigns .
An accurate system for disclosing the sources of
campaign ftnancing, therefore, is closely related to the problem

of establishing an effective standard of ethics in government .
If it can be devised, and the Senate last year passed a sweeping
bill for that purpose, an effective disclosure procedure could
go a long way to remove the notion that the financial generosity
of campaign contributors is a significant determinant of the
policies of government.
As a practical matter, however, I think it must
be recognized that political campaigns are an integral element
in the free political life of this nation and that the cost of
such campaigns has skyrocketed, especially with the ever-wider
usage of television.
some way.

The costs of campaigning must be met in

It is met now in some instances by candidates of

wealth out of personal wealth.

It is met, too, by the private

contribution whether in the form of a five-dollar or five-thousand
dollar donation; whether by a one-hundred-dollar-a-plate political
dinner, or a one-thousand-dollar-a-head political gathering .

Each

party searches

const~y~~~aising

enterprises i n

order to meet the mounting costs of political activity.
In my judgment, the present methods of political
financing are clearly i nadequate and unsatisfactory but they
remain the only methods which are available.

They pose a problem

which must be faced and faced soon, as an aspect of the over-all
problem of the ethical conduct of government.

Unless it is faced,

entry i nto the highest elected offices of the nation i s likely to
be more and more shut off, as a practical matter, from broad public
control.

The needs of the nat ion, i n my view, require equitable

opportunities for citizens to participate i n the entire electoral
process, from beginning to end. not merely i n the final casting
of ballots.
The only visible answer to this problem, so far
as I am aware, is some form of direct or i ndirect public financi ng of at least major election costs, coupled with strict and
enforceable maximums for all expenditures in election campaigns.

Stating a solution, however, is far easier than devising a
workable formula.

The problem is immensely complicated .

I

regret to say in this connection that the Senate spent many
weeks last year in trying without success to create a practical
system of public campaign financing.

That we were unsuccessful,

however, makes the need no less imperative.

The effort must be

continued, and it will be continued.
In addit i on to conflicts involving financial
matters, elected officials are under the constant stress of
what might be termed the conflicts of constituencies .
is a Senator from a particular state.

A Senator

As such, he owes a primary

political allegiance to that group of Americans who inhabit his
state .

He is elected to speak for them--for those who voted

against him as well as for those who voted for him.
however, a Senator of the United States .

He is also,

His oath of office

encompasses the nation as a whole and is addressed to the
nati onal interest.

The problem of reconciliation of these two
responsibilities is difficult, notably when questions of immediate and specific state and secti onal interests arise .

In the

long run, however, the problem tends to take care of itself
because in thi s day and age, i t is doubtful that any Member of
the Senate can serve hi s state's interests adequately without
also serving the nation's interests effectively.

More and more,

the issues encompass the entire nation .
For a Majority Leader, there is a further
complication .

He is not the President's Majori ty Leader, but

rather the Senate's leader, elected by the majority of the
Senate and serving at its pleasure .

Nevertheless, the Majority

Leader also has a responsi bi l i ty respecting the policies of an
incumbent administration.

To hi s personal estimates of the

interests of hi s state and t he nation, therefore, he must add
a sympatheti c consi deration of the administration's programs and

he must do what he can to bring them before the Senate for
deci sion.
I am frank to say that the diffi culty of carryi ng water on each shoulder as a Senator of a state and as a
Senator of the Uni ted States is greatly hei ghtened when thi s
thi rd bucket i s set on the t op of one's head.

Nevertheless,

I have performed thi s function under the Administration of the
late President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and that of President
Johnson.

Far more often than not, I have found myself in

agreement wi th the polici es of both Presi dents.
however, there have been disagreements.

Occasionally,

I do not think i t is

any secret, for example, that I have had my individual convictions respecti ng the Vietnamese problem.

As a Senator of

Montana, I have expressed these convicti ons many times.

Never-

theless, as Majori ty Leader, I have sought to interpret to the
Administrati on the senti ments of the Senate, as a whole, as they

..

have developed with respect to this issue and, to the Senate,
I have on many occasions tried to interpret the President's
positi on.
There is for a Senator one other stress to which
I should like to make reference before concludi ng.
from a conflict of conscience .

It arises

"Your representative, " said

Edmund Burke in the British Parliament two centuries ago, "owes
you not h i s industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays
instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion . "
Arthur Watkins, as a Senator of this State of
Utah, clearly understood

th~s

conflict.

In an era of fear and

apprehension which bordered upon panic, he responded to the
dictates of his conscience.

He carried out faithfully what

has always been one of the most distasteful responsibilities
that the Senate can place upon a member--the judgment of the
acts of another member.

His contribution, as I recall, was not

CQPV

a popular one at the time, but the Senate followed h i s leadership and history has adjudged the rightness of his course.

His

was an act of the highest integrity which did much tomfeguard
the demeanor of the Senate and the processes of orderly government in the United States .

His was a decisive contribution to

the direction and quality of our national life at a most
critical moment.

I conclude now by accepting this award,
recognizi.ng that there are those associated with me in the
Senate who are far more deserving of this singular honor .
I accept it, therefore, not for myself personally, but as
a kind of agent of those Americans of courage, integrity,
and wisdom who, elected to serve this nation and its people
in the Senate, have tried to serve to the best of their
abilities.
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It is with deep respect that I refer to the contribution to the nation which is derived from the Senators of th's
State .

May I say that the honorary law doctorate from Arkansas

University which is held by John McClellan is most appropriate
in view of his outstanding work in the Senate.

Under his direction,

the Committee on Government Operations has achieved national
renown by bringing a

co~~ective

legal light into certain more or

less obscure corners of American life and practice.
As for J. William Fulbright, the contribution of
the former President of this University is one which I have experi enced directly in the Committee on Foreign Relations .

Senator

Fulbright possesses one of the finest intellects in the Senate.
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He keeps it honed, moreover, to a razor's edge by a fierce integrity .

His importance to this nation and its foreign relations

predates the problem of Viet Nam and, long after that problem is
resolved, his influence for internatjonal order will continue to
be felt .
If I were to speak on the public issue which is
most on my mind (and I expect that it is also most on yours) I
would focus on Viet Nam.

Yet, this problem has dominated our

attention for so long that there is danger in the excess . Understandably but
rise

regrettably~

the anxieties to which Viet Nam gives

tend to invite neglect of other grave international

questions .
Viet Nam is a part of our worldwide commitments;
it is not the whole.

The over-all pattern of these

co~~itments

was in need of deep reap,raisal even before the tragedy of Viet
Nam assumed its present dimensions .

The war has not obviated the

need; if anything, it has made it more compelling .

If our own

perceptions do not soon bring us to this reappraisal, we may well

- 3 be led to it, helter- skelter, by circumstances which lie beyond
our control.
For many years, there has been a cont i nuous flow
abroad of human and material resources in support of the defense
and other policies of this nation.

Today, the flow is a flood to

Viet Nam, even as it remains heavy elsewhere in Asia and in Europe
and other parts of the world.

There is ample ind1cation that the

worldwide load which we are carrying may be greater than necessary .
Certainly it is already greater than can be sustained at the current
level of national sacrifice .
The effect of the outward drain is felt in many ways.
At home, it bears a relationship to our apparent inability to come
to grips with the situation in the urban areas .

As a case in

point, it should be noted that a special Presidential Commission
has just completed a monumental report on this problem .

The

Commission emphasizes that the crisis in the cities cries out for
a great concentration of constructive effort .

Yet, I am frank to

say that in the light of our national engagements abroad, the

- 4 prospects for finding the national will and the resources for this
concentration are not encouraging.
The costly overseas commitment also bears relationship to the huge budgetary deficits and to the pressures of inflation which are generated therein.

Its effect is felt, too, in the

nation's balance of international payments;

fo~

some years . now,

this gauge has flashed the warnings of financial qver-extension.
It is now clear that we have been trying to do too
muuh with too little in the way of national sacrifice.
are going to be necessary.

Adjustments

In fact, they have already begun.

That

is the significance of a recent Presidential order . . ·
which called for a ten percent cut in governmental personnel
overseas.

That is the signifi cance of the sharply reduced alloca-

tion for foreign aid in this year's budget .

These are, in my

judgment, wise actions; however l i mited,they do compel more care
in evaluating current foreign undertakings .

- 5 The Administration has also called for complementary
actions which will require increased sacrifices from the people
of the nation .

That is the meaning of the recent call- up of more

reservists, the ending of certain draft deferments , and other manpower changes.

That, too, is the meaning of proposals to discour-

age travel and investment overseas by Americans and the request
for a surtax on top of the income tax.

Whatever their individual

merit, all of these measures are clear calls for a greater contribution to the
sounding.

nat ~ on.

Tiley

a~e,

mo~eover,

There will be more to come, far

curtailment in the present pattern of our

only the first note's
more~

if there is no
overseas engage-

ment .
That we face an urgent situation is largely the
consequence of the heavy demands of the conflict in Viet Nam .

The

war, however, has only underscored what has long been, in fact,
the need for a thorough reassessment of our worldwide responsibilities.

These responsibil i t i es still derive from international

circumstances as they were many years ago.

Yet, we have not had

- 6 occasion to think long and deeply about their present validity.
We have not had occasion to ask whether a kind of obsolescence
or inertia of policy is not exact i ng an excessive tribute.
May I say that while a thorough r eassessment of our
overseas commitments might be carried out by a new Administration,
I reject categorically the notion that it can be carried out only
by a new Administration.

The latter contention is already heard

and you may expect to hear it with ever- increasing frequency in
the months ahead .

In reality, however, we are confronted with a

problem which is deeper than election-year politics.

It goes to

the capacity of both the Executive Branch and the Congress to face
up to the facts of the situation i n which we find ourselves .

It

goes to the capacity of elected officials and appo l nted officials,
most of whom serve in administrati on after administration, to look
anew and to think anew .

It goes to the national readiness to

bring our responses into line with today ' s international
realities.

- 7 In any assessment of our situation abroad, it can
be said that our present commitment began with the United Nations
Charter, almost a quarter of a century ago .

People of my genera-

tion thought to end once and for all, as the U. N. Charter terms
it,

11

the scourge of war. 11

We sought to replace a hit-or- miss

national control of war with a form of international consortium
to maintain the peace.

We acted to initiate a universal system

of mutual security, order and progress in the United Nations.
From the outset, the concepts of the United Nations
Charter did not work or, at any rate, worked very inadequately .
It was not long before the pr1ncipal nations of the world fell back
once again upon the not unfamiljar rivalries of national power and
alliances .

Unlike what had transpired after World War I, the

United States plunged into the vanguard of these practices.

We

took the lead in expanding a system of defense alliances which
reached into almost every part of the globe.

We put our primary

trust for national security in this system and in our own unilateral

- 8 military capacities--especially in nuclear weapons over which we
exercised a brief monopoly.
The Soviet Union was the focus of our concerns.
We saw Moscow at the pinnacle of a Communist monolith, with one
side extending down into Eastern Europe and the other resting on
what was presumed to be a Soviet=enslaved China.
Communist parties and leaders

ev~Nhere

dancing to tunes played by Stalin.
able bear.

We viewed all

in the world as puppets

We saw Communism as an insati -

We saw it as the tentacles of a giant octopus.

We

saw it in many other forms and shapes- - hideous, inhuman and
irreconcilably hostile .
Over-simplified or not, this concept was of great
significance after World War II

in precipitating the massive

expansion of our overseas commitments.

It induced th i s nation,

once wary of any involvement beyond the Western

Hemispher~

accept unprecedented internati onal responsibilities.

to

The fear

of Soviet expansion was not the only factor in this process.
Rather, that fear was interwoven with an intellectual revulsion

- 9 against any return to prewar isolation, with a deep-seated American ideal i sm for peace and with a broad sympathy for the countless
millions of the less fortunate on earth.
Sometimes with reluctance, sometimes with enthusiasm, but j_nvariably with a new sense of leadership, this nation
launched . programs of many kinds throughout the world.

The

magnitude of thi s effort is suggested by the over-all totals of
aid since 1946.

To date, the United States has provided in the

neighborhood of $130 billion in grants and loans to about 120
nations .
In the pursuit of a fool - proof security, moreover,
we entered into defense treaties with so robust an enthusiasm
that the term

11

pactomania 11 found its way into the language.

By

1954, there were formal defense ties with 42 nations, most of whom
were embraced by three great regional all i ances.

The Inter- Ameri-

can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance included all of the Latin
American nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty stretched across

the ocean and to the Eastern Mediterranean to take in Greece and
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Turkey.

The SEATO Treaty brought us into defensive concert with

ten nations on behalf of the security of the Asian and Pacific
region.
After 1954, additional countries received assurances in the nature of defense commitments from the United States.
By this process , Spain, Iran and Liberta were brought under a
kind of protective wing of this nation and so, too, were both the
Arab states and Israel.

Finally, in 1962, this nation felt

compelled to advise India and Pakistan--both recipients of U. S.
military aid against Communism--that if one, instead, used this
assistance against the other, the United States would undertake
to act on behalf of the victim .
In short, as of today, by request or otherwise, by
formal treaty or otherwise, more than 50 nations have received a
chit- - a commitment-- from the United States which is redeemable
for some kind of military assistance in a crisis.

l
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Over the years, we have undergirded these pledges
with elaborate bilateral and multilateral military organizations.
There has come into existence

unified military commands such as

NATO in Europe and SEATO in Southeast Asia.

Cement for these

structures has been supplied by massive inputs of

s.

U~

aid.

Over the years our defense undertakings have

gro~n

until, today, we station overseas a million and a half of the
three and a half million Ameri cans in uniform.
of course, is

Heading the list,

the cont i gent of more than 500,000 i n Viet Nam.

There are 200,000 located elsewhere in the Far East and 350,000
are in installations in Europe and the Mediterranean.
Some concept of the co st is to be found in the
military expenditures in Viet Nam and in the over-all expenditures
of the Department of Defense .

The cost of the war is conserva-

tively estimated at upwards of $25 billion a year.

Tnat figure

is 31 percent of the budget of the Department of Defense which
is $80 billion .

The total for the Department of Defense, in

turn, is 42.9 percent of all federal expenditures .
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As I have already indicated, it was an initial
concern with Soviet expansion which did so much to precipitate
our vast overseas commitment.

This concern began to be felt

almost immediately after the guns of World War II were stilled.
It was felt in quarrels and disagreements among the victors over
the peace treaties.

It was felt, too, in propagandistic strutting,

oftEn over minor questions which came before the United Nations
in its early years.

It was felt in the irreconcilable posit jons

which were taken on the fundamental issue of international control
of nuclear energy.

The concern was intensified as the Soviet

blockade of Berlin was followed by

t~

cataclysmic collapse in

China and, finally, by the Korean conflict.
The military alliances and the aid which we

pro-

vided did act to but ld up armed strength in Europe as a counterpoise to Soviet Communism.

Economic assistance did help the

nations of Europe to rebuild their economies and,

he~ce,

the

security of their free societies ; and i t did open, at least, the
possibilitws of modern progress i n many neglected and newly
independent nations of the world.

r

r

- 13 In the years after World Wa r II, we had ample
resources for these undertakings.
unscathed from the conflict .
dynami c growth.

Our economy had emerged

It had entered on a period of

The accumulation of neglected inner problems

was not yet of towering dimensions .

In brief, with little strain

at home, we were able to engage ourselves widely in these undertakings abroad.
Today, our internal circumstances are not as they
were a decade and a half ago .
and a half ago.

Nor is the world as it was a decade

These two factors, which are fundamental in the

design of effective foreign policy, have changed very greatly .
Can it be said, however, that the policy itself--the fusing of
understanding, idea and c::>mmitment which should form

policy-~-has

been adjusted adequately in the light of these changes?

It seems

to me most doubtful that it can be so said. On the contrary, a
foreign policy grown routine over many years may well be taking
too much out of this nation.

It may well have become wasteful,

- 14 to say the least .

Even more serious, it may have become of increas

ing trrelevance to the situation which now exists in the world .
As a case in po i nt, it seems to me that the s i tuation in Europe bears close examination.

In Europe--in the two

Europea, East and West--the mutual fears of an earlier time have
receded .

The level of cordiality among governments is rising as

it is among the peoples of Europe .

The barriers are coming down.

Trade, travel, and other exchange, from the Atlantic to the Urals,
is beginning to flourish.
In Western Europe, the once war-devastated democracies have raised their economies to levels of unprecedented
productivity and prosper i ty.

From a desperate financial depen-

dency on AITerican assistance two decades ago, some of our allies
have become holders and even manipulators of great dollar surpluses.

These surpluses are formed i n part from usual commercial

sources such as American tourist expend i tures and investments in
Europe.

They are also created in large part,

howeve~,

from heavy
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U. S. government spending abroad in pursuit of various commitments,
especially the military commitment to NATO .
involves the maintenance of six U.

s.

This commitment

divisions in Europe which,

together with dependents,numbers 600,000 Americans .
It should be noted that these Americans are in
Europe in accord with a Senate recommendation which was made
17 years ago .

In 1951, the Senate urged that the U. S. troop

commitment in Europe be raised from the two

under-

strength divisions remaining after vlorld War II to a pledge of
six divisions for NATO .

This recommendation was put promptly

into effect.
By way of contrast, last year, a resolution was
sponsored by 44 Senators which recommended a return of a substantial part of these six divisions to the United States.

I have

felt for many years that our commitment to NATO could be cut back
to two divisions at a great savings of resources and without in
any way lessening the significance of our pledge of mutual
defense under the North Atlantic Treaty.

- 16 Unlike 17 years ago, however, there has been no
prompt response to these suggestjons from the Senate.

There has

been, on the contrary, a determined resistance to any adjustments
downward in the U.

s.

force - levels in Europe.

Ignored is the

fact that we alone of all the participants have met our pledges
to NATO .
reduction.

Unheeded have been the pleas from the Senate for a
Unnoticed, or at any rate ignored,have been the obvi-

ous changes in the European situatton--the relaxation between
Eastern and Western Europe.

Overlooked he,s been tre growj_ng

Europ8an indifference to NATO .
Last year, it was announced that there would be
a token redeployment to the United States of 35,000 men and their
dependents out of the 350,000 American forces stationed in Europe.
The redeployment was scheduled to begin on January 1, 1968 .

On

January 25, 1968, however, it was announced that the redeployment
has been postponed for ·• administrative reasons . .,
In short, six American

divisi~ns,with

dependents,

remain assigned to Europe, today, as they were a decade and a
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half

ag~.

The

sent so far has

r~sp0nse
>~un

to the financial drain which they repre-

largely confined to the discouragement of

private Americar travel and investment abroad .
-~Jsewhe r e,

policies have·
at all.

The

e ~n

there are also changes to which our

slow to adjust, if,in fact,they have adjusted

~ cncept

of a Communist monolith which did so much to

shape our basic policies has long since toppled.
Yugoslavia chose a path of national
Soviet · domination .

Comm~~ism,

Many years ago

independent of

Over the years, the Yugoslavianexperience

has proved to be not an isolated phenomenon but an accurate fore shadowing of reassertions of national independence throughout
Eastern Europe.

Far from being cogs in a Russian war machine,

the natlons of that regi on are emphasizing their own national
needs .

To satisfy them- -they are heavily economic--they are turn-

ing with frequency and ever- increasing self-assurance to tles wtth
the Western European nations and other non- Communist countries.

- i8 In Asia, a China which once was seen as an obsequious handmaiden of Moscow has chosen so ftercely an independent
posit'on that it has skirted open hostility with the Soviet Uninn .
At least, such was the case prior to the intensification of the
war in Viet Nam.

For sometime, China, too, has been explor ing

contacts with the rest of the world.

Despj_te the setback of the

recent ideological upheavals and the counter- pressures of Viet Nam,
this process is likely to be resumed now that a measure of internal
order has returned.
There have been other significant developments
which relate to the continuing validity of our costly overseas
commitments .

About 50 nations , for example, have become inaepen-

dent and members of the U. N. since 1954; yet that o r ganization
has been allowed to lose sign]. ficance as a factor in the resolutjon of the world's difficulties .

France and China have joined

the Un]ted States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom as
possessors of nuclear weapons; and it is sat d that just one

- 19 explosive in the bulging nuclear arsenals has as much explosive
power as has been used in all wars since the invention of gunpowder.

Yet, the approach to serious disputes, whether in the

Middle East or Southeast Asia or wherever, suggests little awareness of the ticking of the doomsday clock.
In sum, it is apparent that the environment in
which the United States must seek its security, today, is vastly
different from what i t was a few years ago.

It is also apparent,

today, that there are flaws in the i nstruments of policy by which
we have pursued our security over the years.

The concept of mutual

defense, for example, has been and remains, in practice, overwhelmingly weighted on the side of the Ameri can contribution of
resources even though other nations are quite capable of i ncreas ing their contributions .
Foreign aid, too, has been seen not always to
yield the intended result.

I have menti oned how assistance to

both Indi a and Pakistan to counter Communist pressures compelled
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us, in the end, to give an additional commitment of support to
each of these nations as agajnst the possible aggression of the
other .

Similar ironic developments are discernible in Latin

America and elsewhere .

In short, while we may point the blade of

military aid in one direction, once the sword is in other hands,
lt is not always possible to say where or when it will fall.
It is now apparent, too, that economic aid does not
act in non-industrialized nations as it did in helping the industrialized nations of Europe and Japan to reconstruct war- damaged
economies.

Thus, the great effectiveness of the Marshall Plan

has had only the faintest of echoes elsewhere in the world.
in Asia and Africa does not necessarily spur progress or
freedom .

Aid

strengthe~

Indeed, on occasion it may offer a means for evading

the one and for stunting the growth of the other.
Finally, it is now apparent that our resources for
the uses of international security are not unlimited.

Despite

great wealth, we cannot continue to spend on overseas commitments
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at the present rate and still meet the growing internal needs of
this nation.

Certainly, we cannot do so without large increases

in taxes, much more regimentation, and other sacrifices on the
part of all Americans.

To put it bluntly, we have learned that

we cannot allocate $25 billion a year or more on war in Viet Nam,
billions more for defense elsewhere in Asia, in Europe, and other
parts of the globe, and still invest at home in education, health,
housing, transportation, control of air and water pollution,
police protection, or whatever, at a rate which is vital to the
inner stability of this nation.
Most important, we are learning in Viet Nam, at a
tragic cost that an immensity of military power is not enough to
safeguard peace or to yield a relevant freedom.

It is not enough

in a situation where the issues in conflict are not black and
white but many shades of grays.

We are learning, too, in Viet

Nam that what may begin as a modest effort to assist others can
become a nightmare of destruction and a major military involvement

- 22 for this nation .

Uncurbed, it can grow as an open-ended war

until there is no exit for any nation--except in the final idiocy
of the nuclear devastation of the earth .
These are the considerations which strongly urge,
it seems to me, a continuing and intensive appraisal of our
commitments abroad .

It is an appraisal whi.ch should take place

throughout the nation no less than in the Executive Branch of the
government and in the Senate.

There is a great need for national

soul-searching at this critical moment in the history of the
Republic.
It seems to me already evident that the time is
past due for reducing the one-sided emphasis on the American contribution in safeguarding the security of freedom and peace in
the world.

I would urge, in this connection, as I have urged

many times before,and as the Senate urged only a few months ago
by unanimous resolution,that the potentialities of the United
Nations be openly engaged with a view to searching out the path

- 23 to an honorable ending of the war in Viet Nam .

In this connec-

tion, too, I would urge once again-as I have urged many times
before and as many Members of the Senate have urged-- that a
substantial reduction of U. S. forces in Western Europe begin
without further delay.
In my judgment, these adjustments are urgent .
Tney need not wait for reappraisals.
time and again.

They have been appraised

They are needed, now, in an effort to bring

our commitments into better rapport with the current international
situation and with the inner needs of this nation .

They are

needed,now, to check the drift of this nation towards an isolated
and, hence, irrelevant internationalism .
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RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Viet Nam is heavy on the heart of the nation.
Vietnamese war is a tragedy .
lives which i t claims .

The

It is a tragedy i.n the Amerj_can

It is a tragedy in the death and devasta-

tion which, in the name of salvation, it has spread throughout
Viet Nam .
My views on United States policy respecting Viet
Nam are no secret .

I have stated them, restated them, and

elaborated them many times .

I have cautioned against an ever-

deepening military involvement in that conflict .
to any increase in it today .

I am opposed

I believe that the way out of a

barbarous situation is not to go fu r ther into it .

-

2 -

The first step towards peace, in my judgment, is
to concentrate and consolidate t he U. S . military effort and to
escalate the peace - effort , looking towards the negotiation of an
honorable end of the conflict .
That, in brief, is the way I feel about Viet Nam .
That is the way I have felt about it for a long time.
dent knows it.

The Senate knows it .

The Presi-

Montana knows it.

What I have to say to you, today, touches only
indirectly on Viet Nam .

My remarks are intended to go beyond

Viet Nam to what may well be the roots of the war.
lecture of the

se~ies

In this first

on international affairs, I wish to address

your attention to what is the great void in the foreign relations
of this nation-- to the question of China .
As a nation, we have lived through a generation
in only he r esay association with a third of the entire human race .
At the inception of this void, we were engaged in a costly and
indecisive conflict in Korea--on China ' s northeast frontier .

Two

- 3 decades later, we are engaged once again in a costly and indecisive conflict, this time on China's southeast frontier .

These

two great military involvements on the Chinese periphery are not
unrelated to the absence of relevant contact between China and
the United States.
Sooner or later a tenuous truce may be achieved
in Viet Nam even as a truce was achieved in Korea . · In my judgment, however, there will be no durable peace in Korea, Viet Nam,
or anywhere else in Asia unless there is a cand i d confrontation
with the problems of the Sino-U. S. r e lationship.
China needs peace if the potentials of its culture
are to be real i zed.

This

natio~

needs peace for the same reason.

In this day and age, the world needs peace for civilized survival.
You young people have the greatest stake in peace.

For that

reason, I ask you to look beyond Viet Nam, behind Korea, to what
may well be the core of the failure of peace in Asia--to the
U. S.-Chinese estrangement of two decades.

- 4 In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the Declaration
of Independ8nce, sent the first American clipper ship to trade
with China .

The year that President George Washington took the

oath of office, 1789, fourteen American ships were riding at
anchor in the Pearl River off Canton in South China.
There are no American ships in Chinese ports today.
There have not been for almost twenty years.

In

t~enty

years,

hardly an American doctor, scientist, businessman, journalist,
student, or even a tourist has set foot in China.
Across tl:e Pacific Ocean, we and

t~e

Chinese glare

at one another, uncomprehendingly, apprehensively, and suspici ously .

In the United

States~

there is fear of the sudden march

of Chinese armies into Southeast Asia.

In China, there is fear

of a tighter American encirclement and American nuclear attack.
We see millions of Chinese soldiers poised on
China's frontiers.
way.

We see leaders who threaten in a most violent

We see an internal Chinese turmoil to confirm our fears of

- 5 irrationality and recklessness.

Finally, we see a growing

nuclear po\IJer, \'l ith the looming spectre of a full - fledged Chinese
intercontinental ballistic missile force .
On the other hand, the Chinese see themselves
surrounded by massive American military power.

They see U. S.

n&val, ground , and air bases scattered through Japan, Korea ,
Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand .

They see

over half a million American troops in neighboring Viet Nam and
hundreds of thousands more nearby.

They see tremendous nuclear

capability with missiles zeroed in on Chinese cities .
the United Sta.tes as

11

They see

occupyj_ng 11 the Chinese island of Taiwt1n

and supporting a Chinese government v1hose declared aim is the
recapture of the mainland.

And they see, too, what they describe

as a growing collusion between the United States and the
Union, a country

~hich

So~iet

they believe infringes China's borders,

threatens to corrupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an
unwelcome influence throughout Asia .

- 6 We and the Chinese have not always looked at one
another with such baleful mistrust .

The American images of China

have fluctuated and shifted in an almost cyclical way.

There has

been the image of the China of wisdom, intelligence, industry,
piety, stoicism , and strength .

This is the China of Marco Polo,

Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan,and heroic resistance to the Japanese
during World War II .
On the other hand, there has been the inage of
the China of cruelty, barbarism, violence,a:':ld faceless hordes.
This is the China of drum-head trials, summary executions, Fu
Manchu,and the Boxer Rebellion--the China that is summed up in
the phrase

11

yell0\'1 peril.

11

Throughout our history, these two images have
alternated, with first one predominant and then the other.

In

the eighteenth century, we looked up to China as an ancient
civilization- - superior in many aspects of technology, culture,
and social order and surrounded by an air of splendid mystery.

- 7 Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's quick defeat by
the British in the Opium War of 1840 .

There followed acts of

humiliation of China such as participation in extra- territorial
treaty rights and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 .
Attitudes shifted again in the early twentieth
century to one of benevolence largely in consequence of the influence of missionaries.

There were more missionaries in China from

the Uni ted States than from any other country.

More American

missionaries served in China than anywhere else in the world.

The

Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people.
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in

1937 produced another shift from benevolence to admiration.

At

the end of the Second World War, admiration was displaced by dis appointment and frustration, as the wartime truce between Nationalist and Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal
strife.

This nation became profoundly disenchanted with China, a

disenchantment which was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility.

- 8 The hostility was largely a reaction, of course,
to the coming to power of a Communist r egime on the Chinese mainland .

We did not interpr et this event as a consequence of the

massive difficulties and the vast inner weaknesses of a war- torn
China .

Rathe~

we saw it almost as an affront to this nation .

We

saw it as a treacherous extension of the Soviet steam- roller
policies which had reduced Eastern and Central Europe to subservience at the end of vlorld War II.
Then, in 1948, came a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin .

The triumph of

a Communist government in China followed immediately after these
events in Europe .

The nation was shaken to its fingertips .

Still, the press of events continued relentlessly.
In June 1950, the North Koreans launched a sudden attack on South
Korea .

The Chinese forces intervened in the war in November of

that year,

The United States was brought into a major military

confrontation in which, for the first time , the Chinese were
enemies and not allies .

- 9 After these events, the assumptions of American
policy towards China were revised.

An effort was made to meet

both the concern and outrage respecting China which existed in
this nation and the revolutionary militancy of the new Chinese
regime in Asia .

Pol icy was cast anew on the premise that the

government on the Chinese mainland was an aggressor which, subject
to directions from Moscow , would use force to impose international
Communism on Asia.

Conversely, it was assumed that if the

endorsement of the free nations were withheld, this regime which
vvas s--aid to be "alien" to the Chinese people -- some sort of overgrown puppet of Moscow- - would wither and eventually collapse.
On this basis, recognition was not extended to
Peking.

The official view was that the National

Government,

which had retreated to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak
for all of China.

We cut off all trade with the mainland and

did what could be done to encourage other countries to follow
suit.

In a similar fashion, we led a diplomatic campaign year
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after year against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic
in the United Nations .

We drew an arc of military alliances on

the seaward side of China and undergirded them with the deployment of massive American military

powe~

in bases throughout the

Western Pacific .
Much has happened to call into question the assumptions in which these policies towards China have been rooted.

In

the first place, the People's Republic has shown itself to be
neither a part of a Communist monolith nor a carbon copy of Soviet
Russia.

The fact is that,of the numerous divisions which have

arisen within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow
and Peking have been the most significant.

They so remain today

although the more rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat
tempered by the war in Viet Nam.
At the same time, the government on the mainland
has not only survived, it has provided China with a functioning
leadership.

Under its direction, Chinese society has achieved a
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degree of economic and scientific progress, apparently sufficient
for survival of an enormous and growing population and sophisticated enough to produce thermo-nuclear explosions .
In the last two years, the so- called Cultural
Revolution in China has rekindled what has been a periodic expecta
tion that the Peking government is on the verge of collapse and
the way is open for a military return to the mainland of the
National Government on Taiwan.

There seems to be little doubt

that the turmoil in China has caused serious disruptions.

What

appears in conflict in the cultural revolution, however, is not
the Peking structure as such but the adequacy of its ideological
content.

That would be a far cry from the kind of popular revul-

sion which might be expected to open the doors to a new regime .
In any event, the worst of the upheavals within
China appear to have ended months ago, without any irreparable
break in the continuity of the government or the operations of
the economy .

It is the height of folly to envision, in the
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present s.Ltuatton, an occasion for the overthrow of the Peking
governm•:mt by extf::rnal military pressures.

Indeed, what would

be better calculated to end, overnight, the remaining ferment on
the mainland

tha~

a plausible threat to the security of China or

an actual attack on Chinese territory?
If the People's Republic, then, is here to stay,
what of the other assumption on which this nation's policy respect·
ing China has long been based?

v~~t

of the assumption that the

Chinese government is an expanding and aggressive force?

That

it is restrained from sweeping through Asia because we have electec
to meet its challenge along the 17th Parallel whjch divides the
Northern and Southern parts of Viet Nam?
In recent years, the present Chinese government
has not shown any great eagerness to use force to spread its
elsewhere in Asia
ideology/although Chinese armies have been employed in assertion
of the traditional borders of China .

To be sure, China has given

enthusiastic encouragement and has promised to support wars of
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However, China has not participated

directly in these wars and support, when it has been forthcoming,
has been limited

a~d

circumspect.

In Viet Nam, for example, there is certainly
Chinese encouragement and aid for the North Vietnamese and the
Viet Cong.

Chinese involvement, however, has beenfar more peri-

pheral than our own .

The enemy soldiers with whom we are compellef

to grapple are all Vietnamese and, in fact, mostly South Vietnames(
At every stage of the war, the assistance we have provided to
South Viet Nam has far exceeded the aid from China and from all
outside sources to the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam--both in terms
of men and materiel.

There is Chinese equipment in South Viet

Nam but there are no Chinese battalions.

Even in North Viet Nam,

Chinese manpower is reported to amount, at most, to one- tenth of
our forces in Viet Nam, and the great

b~lk

of these Chinese are

labor troops, some involved in air-defense but most of them
engaged in repairing bomb damage to roads, railroads, bridges,
and the like.

- 14 Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan
frontier of India,are often cited as evidence of militant Chinese
Communist aggression .

The fact is, however, that Tibet has been

regarded, for many decades, as falling within China's over-all
boundari.es .

Not only the Peking government but also the Chinese

National Government on Taiwan insiststhat Tibet belongs to China.
India also acknowledges such to be the case .

Indeed, American

policy has never recognized Tibet as other than Chinese terrl.tory .
In the case of the border war with India in 1962,
the Chinese Communists occupied territories which, again,

n~t

only they, but also the Chinese Nationalists, consider to be
Chinese .

It is not precisely characteristic of a militant

expansionism, moreover, for a government to withdraw its military
forces from a territory which they have invested .
government did so
1962

Yet, the Peking

from parts of India which were occupied in

as well as from North Korea .

- 15 As for indirect aggression through economic means,
China has been able to exert only a limited influence, either
through aid or trade .

In Afr ica .and, indeed, in Southeast Asia,

where attempts have been made to use trade and aid for political
ends, the results have not been conspicuously successful.

The

fact is that most of China ' s trade today res ts on a commercialeconomic base .

It is carried on largely with the non-Communist

countries, including, may I add, many of our closest allies.
In short, to speak of China, today, as aggressively·
expansionist is to respond to Chinese words rather than Chinese
actions .

That is not to say that China will not

of threats tomorrow .

pose all manner

If there are not enough nightmares already,

consider the prospects when China's nuclear capabilities will
have been extensively developed, along with a full - fledged intercontinental ballistic missile force .
Of course, there is an immens.e potential danger
in China; but there is also an immense potential danger in every
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to maintain civilized survival in a nuclear age except on the
razor's edge.

Insofar as China is concerned, the fundamental

question for us is not whether it is a danger, real or potential.
The fundamental question l.s whether our present policies act to
alleviate or to exacerbate the danger .

Do we forestall the

danger by jousting with the shadows and suspicions of the past?
Do we help by a continuance in policies which do little if anything to lift the heavy curtain of mutual ignorance and hostility?
Like it or not, the present Chinese government is
here to stay .

Like it or not, China is a major power in Asia and

is on the way to becoming a nuclear power.

Is it, therefore, in

this nation's interest and in the interest

of world peace to put

aside, once and for all, what have been the persistent but futile
attempts to isolate China?

Is it, therefore, in this nation's

interest and in the interest of world peace to try conscientiously
and consistently to do whatever we can do--and, admittedly, it is

- 17 -

not much- - to reshape the relationship with the Chinese along more
constructive and stable lines?

In short, is it propitious for

this nation to try to do what, in fact, the policies of most of
the other Western uemocracies have already long since done regar ding their Chinese relationships?
I must say that the deepening of the conflict in
Viet Nam makes more difficult
China.

adjus~ments

in policies respecting

Indeed, the present course of events in Viet Nam almost

insures that there shall be no changes.

lt is not easy to con-

template an alleviation with any nation which cheers on those
who are engaged in inflictl.ng casualties on

Arr~icans .

Yet, it

may well be that this alleviation is an essential aspect of ending the war and, hence, American casualties .

That consideration,

alone, it seems to me, makes desirable initiatives towards China
at this time.
There are several obvious areas in which these
initiatives would have relevance.

Discriminatory restriction

- 1& on travel to China, for example, is certainly one of these areas.
The Chinese may or may not admit Americans to their country, as
they choose .

But it is difficult to understand why our own

government should in any way, shape,

o~

form seek to stand in the

way of the attempts of American citizens to breech the great wall
of estrangement between the two nations .

It is, indeed, ironic

that during the past three years there have been more visits of
Americans to North Viet Nam, a nation with which we are at war,
than to China in the past thtrteen years .
On the question of travel, it should be recalled
that the Chinese were the first to suggest in 1956 that American
journalists visit China.

The suggestion was summarily rejected

by the then Secretary of State.

When, later, it was decided to

accept the suggestion, the Chinese had changed their minds.
Since that tlme, thl.s nation has been more inclined to ease the
travel barri8rs, on the basis of official agreement for exchanges
of persons, but the Chinese have shown no disposition to enter
into agreements or, for that matter, to admit Americans on any
basis .

- 19 -

In any event, it seems to me that it is in the
positive interest of this nation to encourage Americans, if they
can gain entry, to travel to China.

May I add, I refer not merely

to the travel of selected journalists, doctors, and other specialists, as is now the policy, but to the travel of any responsible
American .

In the same fashion, it seems to me most appropriate

to admit Chinese travelers to the United States under the same
conditions that pertain to

visit~rs

from other Communist countries.

Trade is another area in which long-standing policies respecting China are open to serious question .

Technically,

this country still maintains an embargo on all trade with China.
The basis for this policy is compliance with a voluntary resolution of the United Nations which was adopted at our behest at the
time of the Korean conflict.

It is doubtful that the resolution

ever carried much weight among the trading nations of the world.
In any case, it has long since been forgotten .

Today, the princi-

pal nations in the China trade in rough order of importance are
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the United Kingdom, Japan, the Soviet Union, West Germany,
Australia, Canada, Italy, and France.

Of all the great maritime

nations , the United States alone clings to a total trade embargo
with China .

More0ver, we are also the only

nation in the

world which makes an effort to enforce what can best be described
as a kind of secondary boycott of re-exported Chinese products .
These policies have had little visible economic
impact, but they have had the most serious political repercussions .
It is conceivable that, to the Chinese, the policies are something
of an irritant.

To friendly

source of constant friction.

natio~s,

however, they have been a

Most serious, their continuance

over the years has injected unnecessary venom into the atmosphere
of U. S.-Chinese relations.
Nor

ca~

it be said that the situation in Viet Nam

has compelled the pursuit of the embargo and boycott.

The fact

is that these restrictions were in place before most Americans
ever heard of Viet Nam, and, certainly, long before Americans
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became involved in the war .

If the Vietnamese conflict is now

seen as justification for leaving these policies undisturbed,
what is to be said of the existing attitude toward trade with
other Communist countries?
The fact is that the European Communists are providing North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong with sophisticated military equipment which, from all reports, exceeds in value the
assistance which comes from China .
meani~gful

On what basis, then, is it

to permit and even to encourage non-strategic trade

with the European Com.11unist countries while hold:i.ng to a closeddoor poltcy on trade with China?
served by the distinction?

vJhat constructive purpose is

Any rationalization of relations with

China, it seems to me, will require an adjustment of
app~oach .

th~s

dual

We need to move in the direction of equal treatment

of all Communist nations in trade matters, whatever that treatment may be.
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In any event, problems of travel and trade are
secondary obstacles in the development of a more stable relationship between China and the United States .
more significant difficulties .

There are other far

I refer, principally, to the

question of Taiwan and to the war in Viet Nam .
There is no doubt that the Chinese government seeks
in Vi.et Nam a government which is friendly, if not subservient .
Peking has not concealed, moreover, its desire for the t,Ji thdrat·Ial
of American military po"\'Jer from Southeast Asia .

It does not

follow, however, that the price of peace in Southeast Asia is
either Chinese domination or U. S. military intervention .

That

is a black and white oversimplification of a gray situation . The
fact is that neither Burma on China's border nor Cambodia have
been "enslaved" by China, despite an association of many years,
despite periodic d)fficulties with the great state to the north
and despite an absence of U. S. support, aid, or protection .

These two nations have managed to survive in a state of detachment from the power rivalries of the region .

Furthermor e, China

is a signatory to the settlements which emerged from the Geneva
Conferences of 1954 and 1962 and which contain at least a hope
for a middle way to peace in Indo - China .

So far as I am aware ,

the Chinese have not been found in direct or unilateral violation
of these agreements.

It is not impossible that a similar settle-

ment,with Chinese participation, might be reached on Viet Nam.
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped that there can
be a solution along these lines.

Unless it i s found, there is

a very real danger-- as the Korean experience shows -- that the prolongation of war on Chi na's frontiers may well bring about
another U. S. - Chinese armed confrontation.
Perhaps the most important element in the rebuilding of stable relations with China is to be found in a solution
of the problem of Taiwan .

It may help to come to grips with this

issue, if it is understood at the outset that the island of

-

Taiwan is Chinese.
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Tmt is the position of the National Govern-

ment of the Republic of China .
People ' s Republic of China .

That is the position of the

For a quarter of a century, this

common Chinese position has been reinforced by the policies and
actions of the United States government.
Since that is the case, I do not believe that a
solution to the Taiwan question is facilitated by its statement
in terms of a two - China policy, as has been suggested in some
quarters in recent years.

The fact is that there is one China

which happens to have been divided into two parts by events which
occurred a long time ago.

Key factors in the maintenance of

peace between the separate segments have been the interposition
of U.

s.

military pov1er in the Taiwan straits, and the strengthen-

ing of the National Government of China by massive injections of
economic and military aid .
This course was followed by the United States for
many reasons, not the least of which was that it made possible

-
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a refuge for dedicated allies and associates in the war against
Japan .

Most of all, however, it was followed because to have

permitted the closing of the breech by a military clash of the
two opposing Ch'nese forces would have meant a massive bloodbath
and, in the end, the rekindling of another great war in Asia .
Hol"'ever, the situation has changed in the Western
Pacific .

Taiwan is no longer abjectly dependent for its survival

on the United States .

Some of the passions of the deep Chinese

political division have cooled with the passing of time.

Another

generation has appeared and new Chinese societies, in effect,
have grown up m1 both sides of the T ti\'Jan straits .
Is there not, then, some better way to confront
this problem than threat - and- counter- threat between island
Chinese and mainland Chinese?

Is there not some better way to

live with this situation than by the armed truce which depends,
in the last analysis, on the continued presence of the U. S. 7th
Fleet in the Taiwan Straits?

-
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The questions cannot be answered until all
involved are prepared to take a fresh look at the situation.

It

seems to me that it might be helpful if there could be, among the
Chinese themselves, an examination of the possibilities of
improving the climate.

As I have already indicated, the proper

framework for any such consideration would be an acceptance of
the contention of both Chinese groups -- that there is only one
China and Taiwan is a part of it.

In that context, the questions

at issue have to do with the dichotomous situation as between
mainland and island governments and the possibility of bringing
about constructive changes therein by peaceful means.
There is no cause to be sanguine about the prospects of an approach of this kind.

One can only hope that time

may have helped to ripen the circumstances for settlement.

It

is apparent, for example, that the concept which held the
Chinese government on Taiwan to be the sole hope of China's
redemption has grown less relevant with the years.

For Taiwan,
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therefore, to remain isolated from the mainland is to court the
risk that the island will be left once again, as it has been on
other occasions, in the backwash of Chinese history.
The removal of the wedge of separation , moreover,
would also seem to acco rd with the interests of the mainland
Chinese government .

It does have a legitimate concern in the

reassertion of the historic connection of Tailvan and China .

It

does have a concern in ending the hostile division which has
been costly and disruptive both within China and in China ' s
internatlonal relationships.
From the point of view of the United States, too,
there is an interest in seeking a less tenuous situation.

Progres:

in settling the Taiwan question could contribute to a general
relaxation of tensions in the Western Pacific and, conceivably,
e'.ren to resolution of the conflict in Viet Nam .

Certainly, it

would make possible a reduction in the enormous and costly overall defense burdens whkh were assumed in Asian waters after World
' ,.
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War II and which, two decades later, still rest on the shoulders
of this nation.
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the basic
adjustment which is needed in policies respecting China is to
make crystal clear that this government does not anticipate, much
less does it seek, the overthrow of the government of the Chinese
mainland.

In addition , there is a need to end the discrimination

which consigns China to an inferior status as among the Communist
countries in this nation's policies respecting travel and trade .
Finally, it ought to be made unequivocal that we are prepared at
all times to meet

wi~h

Chinese representatives- - formally or

informally-- in order to cons i der differences between China and
the United States over Viet Na:n or any other question of common
concern.
Adjustments of this kind in the policies of the
nation, it seems to me, require above all else a fresh perspec tive .

We need to see the situation in Asia as it is today, not

•
-
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as it appeared twenty years ago in the Himalayan upheaval of the
Chinese revolution .

We need to see the situation

not through

the fog of an old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the
enduring interests of the United States in the Western Pacific .
In this context we will eetter be able to find
appropriate responses at appropriate times to the specific
problems of the Sino-U .

s.

relationdhip, whether they have to do

with U. N. representation or
shore islands or whatever.

diplomu~ic

Withou~

recognition or the off-

prior adjustment in perspec-

tive, however, to seek to deal definitively with these questions
would be, to say the least, an exercise in futility .
I should emphasize before concluding that it is
unlikely that there will be any eager Chinese responses to
initiatives on our part.

Nevertheless, I see nothing to be lost

for thjs nation in trying to move along the lines which have
been suggested.

Chines? intransigence is no license for American

•

_ -ao _
J

intransigence.

-

Our stake in the situation in the Western Pacific

is too large for that sort of infantile indulgence .
I see great relevance in thinking deeply of the
issues which divide China and the United States to see if they
can be recast in new and uncluttered molds .
reason, especially for young people, to

There is every

exa~ i ne

most closely the

premises of policy regarding Chi na which were enshrined almost
two decades ago .

The fact is that the breakdown in Chinese - U.S.

relations was one of the great failures of my generation and it
is highly doubtful that its full repair shall be seen in my life time .

The problem, therefore, will fall largely to you.

It is

not a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason to hope
that it may fare better in your hands.
Unlike my generation, you know more about Asia.
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and to the world.

In 1942, four months after Pearl Harbor, for

example, an opinion poll found that sixty percent of a national

-

sample of

America~s
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still could not locate either China or India

on an outl :.ne map of the world .
case today .

Certainly that would not be the

Furthermor e , you have not had the experience of

national trauma

in moving abruptly

f~om

an era mar ked by an

almost fawning benevolence towa r d China to one of thor ough dis enchantment .

You Were spared the

fie~ce

hostilities

whi~h

rent

this nation internally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and
security regarding China gave way to

feeli~gs

of revulsion,

hatred, and insecurity .
Your Chinese

counterpa~ts,

the young people of

today ' s China- - they are called the "Heirs of the Revolution" -have a similar gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific .
Your generation in China , too , has been contained and isola ted,
and its view of the United States has been colored
of another time .

wi~h

the hates

It has had no contact with you or, indeed, with

much o f the world outside China .

On the other hand, those young people have grown
up under easier conditions than the older generation of Chinese
who lived their youth in years of continuous war and revolution.
It may be that they can face you and the rest of the world with
greater equanamity and assurance than has been the case at any
time in modern Chinese history .
I urge you to think for yourselves about China .
I urge you to approach, with a new objectivity, that vast nation,
with its great population of industrious and intelligent people.
Bear in mind that the peace of Asia and

~he

world will depend on

China as much as it does on this nation, the Soviet Union, or any
other, not because China is Communist but because China is China - among the largest countries in the world and the most populous.
Mao Tse - Tung remarked in an interview several years
ago that "future events would be decided by future generations."
Insofar as his words involve the relationshi p of thi s nation and
China, whether they prove to be a prophecy of doom or a forecast
of a happier future will depend not so much on us, the "Old China
Hands" of yeste r day, but on you, the "New American Hands" of
tomorrow .

